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LORILLARD TOBACCO CO. V. REILLY:1 THE
SUPREME COURT SENDS FIRST AMENDMENT
GUARANTEES UP IN SMOKE BY APPLYING THE
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE TO CONTENTBASED REGULATIONS
“But I would have thee remember that if thou shoulds’t become a nonsmoker, it will be because thou hadst decided for thyself . . . for every
man has a free will to accept or reject tobacco unless it has, by its very
nature, taken such a hold on him as to compel him to make a choice in
its favour.”2

I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps every man does have a free will either to accept or reject
tobacco, but the fact tobacco is addictive is undeniable.3 Add to that the
fact tobacco claims hundreds of thousands of lives each year4 and costs
the United States millions of dollars,5 and it is easy to see why
1. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
2. ESTHER WANNING, MEDITATIONS FOR SURVIVING WITHOUT CIGARETTES 7 (1994)
(citing A.A. WILLIAMS, A SMOKER’S PILGRIM’S PROGRESS (1922)).
3. American
Lung
Association
Fact
Sheet:
Smoking,
at
http://www.lungusa.org/tobacco/smoking _ factsheet99.html (last modified June 2002) (on file with
the Akron Law Review). “Nicotine is an addictive drug, which when inhaled in cigarette smoke
reaches the brain faster than drugs that enter the body intravenously. Smokers become not only
physically addicted to nicotine; they also link smoking with many social activities, making smoking
a difficult habit to break.” Id. Moreover, nicotine is not the only chemical found in cigarettes; they
are known to contain “at least 43 distinct cancer-causing chemicals.” Id.
4. Id. According to the American Lung Association, tobacco is responsible for the deaths of
approximately 440,000 Americans each year. Id. Included in this figure are the deaths of babies
born prematurely to mothers who smoke, and those whose diseases are the result of secondhand
smoke. Id. While lung cancer is the disease that most comes to mind when cigarettes are
mentioned, tobacco is responsible for a host of other diseases including emphysema, chronic
bronchitis, coronary heart disease, and stroke. Id. Smoking has also “been linked to a variety of
other conditions and disorders. . . .” Id.
5. Id. “Smoking costs the United States approximately $150 billion each year in health-care
costs and lost productivity.” Id. However, in 1998, the gross domestic product for tobacco
manufacturers was 17.9 billion dollars. U.S.CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 452 (2000). Tobacco is also a major export. See generally Susan M. Marsh, U.S.
Tobacco Exports: Toward Monitoring and Regulation Consistent with Acknowledged Health Risks,
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government regulation has become widespread in this area.6
Nevertheless, while Congress may legislate tobacco advertising to some
extent,7 not all legislation has been found constitutional.8 This is due, in
15 WIS. INT’L L.J. 29, 29-33 (1996) (discussing the conflicting goals between discouraging tobacco
because of its health risks and promoting it because of its value as an export). See also Andrea J.
Hageman, Note, U.S. Tobacco Exports: The Dichotomy Between Trade and Health Policies, 1
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 175, 175 (1992) (“The conflicting goals of promoting tobacco exports and
discouraging smoking have created a dichotomy in U.S. policy.”).
6. Centers for Disease Control, Select Actions of the U.S. Government Regarding the
Regulation
of
Tobacco
Sales,
Marketing,
and
Use,
at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/overview/regulate.htm (last updated August 12, 2002) (listing the
important tobacco regulations beginning with the Food and Drug Act of 1906 and ending with
recent regulations) (on file with the Akron Law Review).
7. Several legislative acts have shaped the way tobacco has been advertised in this country
for roughly 30 years. The first important act was the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act of 1965. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13311340 (1994)). This act required cigarette labels to carry the warning “Caution: Cigarette Smoking
May Be Hazardous to Your Health.” Id. In 1969, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act
required a new warning label which required the statement “Warning: The Surgeon General Has
Determined that Cigarette Smoking is Dangerous to Your Health.” Pub. L. No. 92-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994)). At this time, there was also an
electronic ban, which prohibited cigarette advertising on the radio and television. Id. This Act also
prohibited the states from regulating cigarette advertising for health-related reasons. Id. In 1973,
the Little Cigar Act extended the electronic ban to include little cigars. Pub. L. No. 93-109, 87 Stat.
352 (1973) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994)). In 1984, the Comprehensive
Smoking Education Act established four warnings, which were to be rotated on cigarette packages
and advertisements. Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1331-1340 (1994)). These warnings stated: (1) Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease and
May Complicate Pregnancy; (2) Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your
Health; (3) Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low
Birth Weight; and (4) Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide. Id. In 1986, the
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act established three warnings similar to
those instituted for cigarettes, which were to be placed on smokeless tobacco packages and
advertisements. Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 4406
(1994)). These warnings stated: (1) This Product May Cause Mouth Cancer; (2) This Product May
Cause Gum Disease and Tooth Loss; and (3) This Product is not a Safe Alternative to Cigarettes.
Id.
8. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). In Brown &
Williamson, the Supreme Court held that the FDA does not have the authority to regulate the
marketing of tobacco products. Id. at 126. This decision came as the result of regulations issued in
1996, that attempted to address the problem of tobacco use by adolescents. Id. at 127. The 1996
regulations, some of which were mirrored in Lorillard, would have prohibited the sale of cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco to minors, required retailers to check the ages of purchasers with photo
identification, prohibited the sale of packages containing less than twenty cigarettes, prohibited free
samples of cigarettes, prohibited the sale of cigarettes in vending machines in locations accessible to
minors, required black and white only advertising in areas accessible to minors, prohibited outdoor
advertising in areas within one-thousand feet of public playgrounds and schools, prohibited the
distribution of promotional items containing a brand name, and prohibited the tobacco
manufacturers from sponsoring events. Id. See generally Gerald W. Griffin, Note, Looking Past a
Smoke Screen: A First Amendment Analysis of the Food and Drug Administration’s Rule Restricting
Tobacco Advertising, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 363 (1997) (arguing that the 1996 regulations violate the First
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large part, to the First Amendment’s protection against government
interference with advertising.9
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Supreme Court examined
the extent to which the First Amendment protects tobacco advertising.10
With teenage smoking on the rise,11 the focus and blame is often on
advertising.12 In fact, even tobacco manufacturers have attempted to
institute programs designed to curb youth smoking.13 Yet, Lorillard
demonstrates that while tobacco companies may be willing to join the
Amendment because they restrict commercial speech); Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine
Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA’s Effort to Regulate Tobacco Products, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1996)
(discussing the FDA’s authority generally and the government’s interest in controlling the use of
tobacco products); Kathleen M. Paralusz, Ashes to Ashes: Why FDA Regulation of Tobacco
Advertising May Mark the End of the Road for the Marlboro Man, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 89, 101
(1998) (discussing in depth the federal legislation which was subsequently invalidated by the Brown
& Williamson decision).
9. See infra Parts II–IV.
10. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 532 (2001).
11. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CHARTBOOK, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
76 (2000). “Smoking among adolescents has increased in recent years. In 1999 the prevalence of
current cigarette smoking was 27 percent higher than in 1991; current cigarette smoking increased
56 percent among black students, 29 percent among Hispanic students, and 25 percent among white
students.” Id. More importantly, it is estimated that over 80 percent of adults who smoke began
doing so when they were adolescents. Id. It is thought that while adolescents are aware that there
are risks to smoking, they do not think that the risks apply to them. Paralusz, supra note 8, at 89.
12. AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION, supra note 3 (stating that tobacco advertising encourages
adolescents to begin smoking before they are capable enough to understand the associated health
risks). See also Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Article, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999) (discussing the impact of
market manipulation in selling products); Paralusz, supra note 8, at 91 (noting the causal connection
between cigarette advertisements and teen smoking). It is thought that teens are more attentive than
adults to cigarette advertising. Michael Schudson, Symbols and Smokers: Advertising, Health
Messages, and Public Policy, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 208, 216
(Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993). The fact teens smoke the most heavily
advertised brands seems to prove this. Paralusz, supra note 8, at 92 (citing David A Kessler et al.,
The Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Tobacco Products, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 998,
992 (1996)). The volume of such advertising can be illustrated by the fact that in 1999 the tobacco
industry spent approximately $481,200,000 on tobacco related advertising. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
supra note 5, at 579.
13. See,
e.g.,
Lorillard
Tobacco
Co.,
Youth
Smoking
Prevention,
at
http://www.lorillard.net/card.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2001) (on file with the Akron Law Review).
Lorillard Tobacco Company sponsors a Youth Smoking Prevention Program. Id. The company
believes “that the most effective way to encourage kids not to smoke is through responsible and
thoughtful programs . . . . In addition to the consumer-directed initiatives, [Lorillard believes] one
of the most effective ways of reducing underage smoking is [by] restricting access to tobacco
products.” Id. Along with other tobacco companies, Lorillard sponsors the “We Card” retail
program, which can be seen in both print and media broadcast advertising. Id. This, however, is a
marked change in position by the tobacco manufacturers. See Paralusz, supra note 8, at 94 (noting
that at one time tobacco companies had strongly denied marketing their products to children, but
that evidence in response to litigation proved otherwise).
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fight against youth smoking, they are not willing to give up their First
Amendment rights.14 Lorillard also illustrates that while the First
Amendment is not easily displaced, its guarantees are continually
wearing away.15
This note examines why the Supreme Court’s application of the
commercial speech doctrine to purely “content-based”16 regulations
erodes First Amendment guarantees.17 Section II provides a brief history
of the First Amendment and discusses the different levels of judicial
scrutiny applied in First Amendment cases.18 Section III provides the
statement of facts, the procedural history, and the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Lorillard.19 Finally, Part IV examines the decision in
Lorillard and discusses why the Court should have applied strict
scrutiny to the regulations at issue.20 It further discusses how the Court’s
refusal to apply strict scrutiny to content-based commercial regulations
is in direct contravention of First Amendment principles.21
II. BACKGROUND
A. The First Amendment — History and Overview of Protected Forms
of Speech
1. The Intent of the Framers
The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech.22 However,
14. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 540. See generally DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT:
A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001) (exploring in depth the inner
workings of the tobacco industry and its political struggles against the United States government).
15. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 572 (Thomas, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgement)
(maintaining that strict scrutiny is necessary when regulations seek to restrict speech based on the
ideas conveyed).
16. Technically, all regulations subject to the commercial speech doctrine are content-based.
See infra notes 29-44 and accompanying text. However, the use of the term “content-based”
throughout this Note refers to those regulations, or types of regulations, which are normally subject
to strict judicial scrutiny in order to uphold First Amendment guarantees.
17. See infra Parts II–IV.
18. See infra notes 22-74 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 75-140 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 141-272 and accompanying text.
21. Id.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I. In pertinent part, the First Amendment states “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” Id. The First Amendment became applicable to
the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states “[n]o State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (noting that
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the Framers did not provide much guidance as to the First Amendment’s
meaning.23 As a result, much of its significance must be inferred from
legislative history,24 from the writings of those who drafted the
Constitution,25 and from the time period in general.26 Even though not
much concrete information about the First Amendment’s meaning exists,
free speech is “considered by many to be the cornerstone of [a]
democratic society”27 where the search for truth is paramount.28
the First Amendment is applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment).
23. ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (1941) (discussing that
the drafters of the First Amendment found free speech important, but that they do not say much
about the exact meaning). See also Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and PreHistory of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 749 (1993) (discussing that the First
Amendment does not explain such critical words as speech, freedom, and abridging). It is
surprising there is not more information on the exact meaning of the First Amendment because a
substantial controversy surrounded its creation. See Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First
Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1156 (1986) (examining in detail the history and process of the
drafting of the First Amendment).
24. Denbeaux, supra note 23, at 1171. Moreover,
The only sustained consideration of the meaning of the [F]irst [A]mendment by anyone
with authority to speak was by Madison in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts –
almost ten years after the drafting of the amendment. Madison said of the [F]irst
[A]mendment: “The article of amendment, instead of supposing in Congress a power
that might be exercised over the press, provided its freedom was not abridged, was
meant as a positive denial to Congress of any power whatsoever on the subject . . . .”
Id. (citing Letters from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 23, 1789), in 4 J. MADISON,
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 506, 545 (Philadelphia 1865)).
25. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech? 76 VA. L.
REV. 627, 632 (1990) (“One searches in vain for an indication from any of the people involved with
the drafting of the [F]irst [A]mendment that they were concerned with anything besides politically
oriented speech.”) In fact, James Madison stressed to the House of Representatives that freedom of
speech was “necessary to protect the rights of citizens to criticize government officials.” Id. (citing
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434-36, 440-43 (J. Gales ed., 1789), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 141, 145 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds., 1987)).
26. See generally Scott Sullivan, Note, Tobacco Talk: Why FDA Tobacco Advertising
Restrictions Violate the First Amendment, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 743, 747-49 (1997)
(discussing the history of the First Amendment as gathered from the popular opinion of colonial
America). However, “[t]he persistent image of colonial America as a society that cherished
freedom of expression is a sentimental hallucination that ignores history.” LEONARD W. LEVY,
INTRODUCTION TO FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON, xxix (Leonard W. Levy
ed., 1966). There is little evidence that colonists would receive “advocates of obnoxious or
detestable ideas.” Id. In fact, when opinions that did not conform were expressed, they were likely
to be in violation of the seditious libel laws. Id. at xxx.
27. Diane Ritter, Note, The First Amendment, Commercial Speech, and the Future of Tobacco
Advertising After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1505, 1505 (1997)
(citing THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (1966)).
28. Benjamin Franklin’s “Marketplace of Ideas” theory stressed the concept that if all
opinions were expressed, the truth would overcome error. Benjamin Franklin, An Apology for
Printers, in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON, supra note 26 at 4-6. However,
it has been stated that Franklin was not really a proponent of free speech. Leonard W. Levy, Ben
Franklin’s Creedo for Colonial Printers, in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON,
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2. Protected Forms of Speech
The Supreme Court has divided speech into classes — each of
which is given a different level of protection.29 Speech is classified as
either content-based30 or content-neutral.31 Content-neutral speech is
subject to intermediate judicial scrutiny.32 Content-based speech is
subject to different levels of judicial scrutiny depending on whether the
speech is low-value, high-value, or commercial.33
B. Content-Based Regulations – Strict Scrutiny for the Most Protection
Speech that is regulated based solely on its content is generally
given the most First Amendment protection.34 However, even certain
supra note 26, at 3. In fact, “his few essays on freedom of the press . . . . [w]ere derivative, flaccid,
and unanalytical, almost anti-intellectual.” Id.
29. Kathleen J. Lester, Student Article, Cowboys, Camels, and Commercial Speech: Is the
Tobacco Industry’s Commodification of Childhood Protected by the First Amendment? 24 N. KY.
L. REV. 615, 635 (1997) (citing GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1086 (1996)).
But see THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 345 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis
J. Mahoney eds., 1987) (stating that the Framers of the Constitution are often seen as antidemocratic
because of the type of government that they created).
30. See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text. See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (holding regulations that prohibit speech based on the subject matter are
content-based and invalid).
31. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 570 (1991) (finding ordinance that
regulated public nudity was content-neutral because the state’s interest was in regulating nudity and
not expression).
32. Id. Content-neutral speech restrictions are those that regulate without reference to the
content of the speech. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988). They regulate the time, place, and
manner of the speech at issue, even though the regulations may have an incidental effect on the
speakers. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Content-neutral regulations
must pass the intermediate judicial scrutiny test that was set forth in United States v. O’Brien. 391
U.S. 367 (1968). The O’Brien Court stated that a government regulation passes constitutional
muster if (1) it is within the constitutional powers of the government, (2) it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest, (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free speech, and (4) the incidental restriction on free speech is no greater than essential. Id. at 377.
The Court has recently added a fifth prong to the test, which requires that the regulation must leave
open ample alternative means of communication. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994).
But see Richard A. Seid, Article, A Requiem for O’Brien: On the Nature of Symbolic Speech, 23
CUMB. L. REV. 563, 576 (1993) (arguing intermediate scrutiny is little more than a slightly
heightened rational basis review).
33. Lester, supra note 29, at 635 (discussing how the Supreme Court has divided speech into
low value and high value speech). See also Scott D. Matthews, Note, Will NASCAR Have to Put on
the Brakes?: The Constitutionality of the FDA’s Ban on Brand-Name Tobacco Sponsorship in
Motor Sports, 31 IND. L. REV. 219, 235 (1998) (discussing the level of judicial scrutiny reserved for
commercial speech).
34. But see Toni Elizabeth Gilbert, Note, Economic Regulation of the Cable Television
Industry: Reigning in a Giant at the Expense of the First Amendment, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 615,
621-23 (1996) (noting certain forms of speech, such as obscenity and fighting words can be
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content-based restrictions may be upheld.35 For instance, low-value
speech is entitled to no First Amendment protection.36 Some examples
of low-value speech are fighting words,37 incitements-to-riot,38 and
obscenity.39 High-value speech, which includes political, literary,
artistic, and scientific speech, is given the most protection.40
restricted even if the statutes are content-based). Statutes that are content-based are “subjected to a
more rigorous judicial inquiry” because of the great importance placed on free speech. Elizabeth
Buroker Coffin, Casenote, Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board, 18 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 593, 612 (1993). See also Karl E. Robinson, Comment, Content is in the Eye of the
Beholder: The Supreme Court Upholds the Constitutionality of the 1992 Cable Act’s “Must-Carry”
Provisions, 20 J. CORP. L. 691 (1995) (discussing the significance of the free speech clause as it
relates to content-based regulations). But see Laura V. Farthing, Note, Arkansas Writers’ Project v.
Ragland: The Limits of Content Discrimination Analysis, 78 GEO. L.J. 1949, 1960 (1990) (stating
the Supreme Court has failed to clearly articulate the definition of “content-based”). Farthing
argues:
The Court uses a functional test to make this “content-based” determination: if one has
to look at the content of the communication in order to decide whether the
communication falls into one category rather than another, then the distinction is
“content-based.” Superficially, the definition is clear; on closer examination, however,
the definition blurs. The Court uses the term “content-based” to denote several
distinctions, without analyzing whether all pose equal dangers to the values protected by
the [F]irst [A]mendment.
Id. (citations omitted).
35. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
36. Id. at 572. In Chaplinsky, the defendant was convicted of violating a statute that
prohibited a person from addressing another person with offensive words in public. Id. at 569. The
Court affirmed the appellant’s conviction, finding “fighting words” are low value speech and are not
entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. at 571-72. According to the Court:
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under
all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or “fighting” words – those which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Id. at 571-72 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 572.
38. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 379 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring) (finding speech
that is likely to cause imminent, immediate, or serious harm is not entitled to First Amendment
protection), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (increasing the
standard for incitement to riot to more than mere advocacy).
39. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Court stated that:
[T]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether “the average person
applying contemporary community standards” would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;
and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted). If the work meets the above-stated guidelines, it is considered
obscenity and entitled to no First Amendment protections. Id. at 26.
40. See id. However, even obscenity is entitled to First Amendment protection if it has
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Most content-based statutes must pass strict judicial scrutiny.41 In
order to pass strict scrutiny, the government must: (1) show a compelling
interest, (2) narrowly tailor the regulation to promote that interest, and
(3) ensure there is no less restrictive alternative available.42 Generally,
expression will prevail over government regulations43 unless strict
scrutiny is satisfied.44

“serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. . . .” Id.
41. Coffin, supra note 34, at 613. “A statute which burdens the exercise of protected speech
or expression based upon the content or ideas contained within the expression itself will pass
constitutional muster only if it meets the test of strict or exacting scrutiny.” Id. (citations omitted).
However, certain content-based restrictions are not put through the rigors of a strict scrutiny
analysis because they are considered per se unconstitutional. See Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (finding the University of Virginia’s policy
regulating the funding of newspapers was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination).
“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the
opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” Id. at 829. (citations
omitted). Moreover, “[w]hen the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken
by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.” Id. It is
often hard to tell what constitutes viewpoint discrimination and what is merely a content-based
regulation that should be subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis. See Nicole B. Casarez, Public
Forums, Selective Subsidies, and Shifting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination, 64 ALB. L. REV.
501, 512 (2000) (discussing the difficulty the Supreme Court has had in distinguishing between
content-based regulations or viewpoint discrimination). There are several reasons why viewpoint
discrimination harms the First Amendment. See Anthony J. Colletta, Abridgments of Free Speech
Which Discriminate on the Basis of Viewpoint: Finzer v. Barry, 61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 127, 142
(1986). According to Colletta:
A viewpoint-discriminatory abridgment of speech distorts public debate by silencing one
point of view while providing an opposed viewpoint with exclusive control of a
particular forum. Since this kind of one-sided debate is precisely what the [F]irst
[A]mendment seeks to prevent, viewpoint-discriminatory statutes must be held
unconstitutional, especially where viable viewpoint-neutral alternative [sic] exist.
Id. Moreover, mere attempts by the government to restrict certain viewpoints may “impair the
practice of free speech in a society.” James Weinstein, Free Speech, Abortion Access, and the
Problem of Judicial Viewpoint Discrimination, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 477 (1996). For a
discussion of how the Massachusetts regulations may constitute viewpoint discrimination, see infra
Part IV.
42. U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (holding restrictions
requiring cable operators to scramble sexually explicit programs, or to restrict such programming to
certain hours, failed the strict scrutiny test because there were less restrictive means).
43. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (holding a restriction on the display of signs in
front of a foreign embassy failed strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly tailored).
44. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (finding strict scrutiny satisfied for a
regulation aiming to prohibit individuals from campaigning within one hundred feet of an election
polling place).
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C. The Commercial Speech Doctrine — The Middle Ground of
Intermediate Scrutiny
1. The Early Cases — Creation of the Commercial Speech
Doctrine
At one time, the Supreme Court held that commercial speech was
entitled to no First Amendment protection.45 Nevertheless, in Bigelow v.
Virginia, the commercial speech doctrine was created to offer limited
protection for speech that proposed a commercial transaction.46 The
Bigelow Court balanced the public’s interest in receiving information
with the state’s interest in preventing the speech.47 Bigelow, however,
did little for commercial speech because the Court narrowly limited the
holding to the facts of the case.48
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., the Court expanded the commercial speech doctrine.49
45. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942), limited by Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809 (1975), overruled by Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Valentine, the respondent was forbidden from distributing
flyers, which he had drawn up to advertise his submarine. Id. at 52. It was a violation of a New
York ordinance to distribute such flyers unless they provided “information or a public protest.” Id.
at 53. The Court denied the respondent’s challenge to the bill, finding that there was no protection
of speech that was solely commercial. See id. at 55. According to the Court, “[w]hether, and to
what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent such
activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are matters for legislative
judgment.” Id. at 54.
46. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826 (1975). In Bigelow, the appellant was convicted under a statute
making it a misdemeanor to advertise abortion services. Id. at 811. In reversing the conviction, the
Court distinguished the facts in Bigelow from the facts in Chrestensen. Id. at 821-22. Chrestensen,
the Court stated, merely proposed a commercial transaction. Id. at 822. Moreover, the Court stated
that Chrestensen did not stand for a “sweeping proposition” that all advertising was unprotected. Id.
at 820. Looking at the facts presented in Bigelow, the Court stated “the advertisement conveyed
information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience – not only to readers possibly in
need of the services offered, but also to those with a genuine curiosity about [the issue]. . . .” Id. at
822.
47. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826. The State’s interest in Bigelow was in providing quality
medical care. Id. at 827.
48. Id. at 826.
49. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762. In Virginia Pharmacy, the State Board of Pharmacy
prohibited “advertising or other affirmative dissemination of prescription drug price information. . .
.” Id. at 752. The Court noted the importance of the consumer’s interest in the information, and it
generalized “society also may have a strong interest” in the information. Id. at 763-64. According
to the Court:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless
dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what
reason, and at what price . . . . It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial
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The Court based the expansion of the commercial speech doctrine on the
theory that the First Amendment protects the right to disseminate
information.50 The Court also noted the importance of the public’s right
to receive information.51 However, in Virginia Pharmacy, First
Amendment protection of commercial speech was strictly limited to
truthful, non-deceptive advertising.52
Even though First Amendment protection of commercial speech
began with Virginia Pharmacy, it was not until the landmark case of
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York that the commercial speech doctrine became well
established.53 The importance of Central Hudson lies in the fact that the
Court decided intermediate scrutiny was appropriate for commercial
speech.54 The Court articulated a four-prong test that balanced the
government’s interests with the interests that are served by the
commercial speech.55 First, the speech must not be misleading or related
to unlawful activity.56 Second, the government must have a substantial
interest in regulating the speech.57 Third, the regulation must directly
serve the substantial interest.58 Finally, the regulation must be no more
extensive than necessary.59
information is indispensable.
Id. at 765. (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 756-57 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972)).
51. Id. at 763-64.
52. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976). See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (finding
advertising of contraceptives entitled to First Amendment protection because it was truthful and
nonmisleading); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (holding attorney advertising cannot be
prohibited where the advertising in question was not misleading); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350 (1977) (holding non-misleading attorney advertising protected by the First Amendment).
53. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See also
Joshua A. Marcus, Note, Commercial Speech on the Internet: Spam and the First Amendment, 16
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 245, 253 (1998) (stating Central Hudson appeared to address the issue
of commercial speech by developing a “permanent test”).
54. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
55. Id. at 564. It is important to note the Court acknowledged that commercial speech is
afforded less constitutional protection than high value speech, therefore “[t]he protection available
for particular commercial expression turns on the nature of the expression and of the governmental
interests served by its regulation.” Id. at 563.
56. Id. at 564. According to the Court, the government has less power if the speech is nonmisleading and truthful. Id.
57. Id. “The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on
commercial speech.” Id.
58. Id. “[T]he restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may
not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose.” Id.
59. Id. “[I]f the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on
commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.” Id.
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2. The Later Cases — Application of the Commercial Speech
Doctrine
Although the Central Hudson analysis has been upheld for many
years, the Court has “applied the test with varying degrees of scrutiny.”60
For instance, in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of
Puerto Rico, the Court upheld a statute restricting the advertising of
casino gambling.61 The Court focused primarily on the state’s interest in
protecting the welfare of its residents.62 The effect of Posadas was
ultimately to weaken the commercial speech doctrine by affording
deference to the states.63 Ironically, in the later case of Edenfield v.
Fane, the Court rejected any deference to the state.64 The Edenfield
Court reasoned that the state could not satisfy Central Hudson with
“mere speculation or conjecture.”65 Edenfield illustrates that the Central
Hudson test is malleable and inconsistently applied because it takes an
opposite approach from the one taken in Posadas.66
More evidence of the flexible nature of Central Hudson can be seen
in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.67 In Edge Broadcasting, the
Court considered the constitutionality of a federal statute that regulated
60. Howard K. Jeruchimowitz, Note, Tobacco Advertisements and Commercial Speech
Balancing: A Potential Cancer to Truthful, Nonmisleading Advertisements of Lawful Products, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 432, 447 (1997) (discussing the varying degrees to which the Court applies
Central Hudson in order to uphold various statutes). See also Matthews, supra note 33, at 237
(stating the Supreme Court has continually struggled to consistently apply the Central Hudson test).
61. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 331 (1986).
The statute at issue made it unlawful for casino owners to direct their advertising toward the citizens
of Puerto Rico. Id. at 332. In upholding the statute, the Posadas Court found the first two prongs of
Central Hudson were fulfilled. Id. at 340-43. While the Court found overwhelmingly the
regulations directly advanced the government interest, it also found the regulations were no more
extensive than necessary. Id. at 342-43.
62. Id. at 341. The Court had “no difficulty in concluding that the Puerto Rico Legislature’s
interest [was] in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.” Id.
63. Marcus, supra note 53, at 266.
64. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993). See also Marcus, supra note 53, at 268. In
Edenfield the Court considered the constitutionality of a solicitation ban applicable to certified
public accountants. 507 U.S. at 763. The Court found the ban was unconstitutional and violated the
First Amendment. Id. Resting its decision on the third prong of Central Hudson, the Court found
the regulation at issue did not directly advance the government’s purpose. Id. at 771.
65. Id. at 770. According to the Court, “a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction
on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will
in fact alleviate them to a material degree.” Id. at 770-71.
66. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342. In analyzing the third prong of Central Hudson, the
Posadas Court merely relied on what the legislature believed. Id. The Court stated, “[t]he Puerto
Rico Legislature obviously believed, when it enacted the advertising restrictions at issue here, that
advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico would serve to increase the
demand for the product advertised. We think the legislature’s belief is a reasonable one . . . .” Id.
67. U.S. v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 421 (1993).
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the broadcast advertising of lotteries.68 The Court ultimately found the
statute constitutional, but did so in a way that implied “a piecemeal
approach to solving the problem would be acceptable.”69 Again, the
Court changed its position — this time reverting back to the position it
had taken in Posadas.70
In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, the Court decided whether a
statute prohibiting the advertisement of liquor prices was
constitutional.71 In finding the statute unconstitutional, the Court
showed that it was “still deeply divided on many commercial speech
issues.”72 In fact, several Justices indicated uncertainty surrounding the
commercial speech doctrine.73 Lorillard is the most recent commercial
speech case to come before the Court. It, too, reveals uncertainty
surrounding the commercial speech doctrine and its application to First
Amendment issues.74

68. Id.
69. Marcus, supra note 53, at 269.
70. Id. For instance, in examining the third prong of Central Hudson, the Court indicated it
would not require cold, hard proof that the regulation directly advanced the government interest.
Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 434. This is in direct contradiction with Edenfield. 507 U.S. at 771.
The Edge Broadcasting Court stated “[i]f there is an immediate connection between the advertising
and demand, and the federal regulation decreases advertising, it stands to reason that the policy of
decreasing demand for gambling is correspondingly advanced.” 509 U.S. at 434.
71. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
72. Marcus, supra note 53, at 270.
73. Marcus, supra note 53, at 273. For instance, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
indicated that different regulations may be deserving of differing levels of protection. 44
Liquormart, 518 U.S. at 501. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia mentioned he shared “Justice
Thomas’s [sic] discomfort with the Central Hudson test, which seems . . . to have nothing more than
policy intuition to support it.” Id. at 517. These two comments illustrate that the application of the
commercial speech doctrine is not consistent. See Marcus, supra note 53, at 273. According to
Joshua A. Marcus:
Although twenty years have passed since the Court first explicitly gave commercial
speech First Amendment protection in [Virginia Pharmacy], the commercial speech
doctrine is still not a settled area of law. Despite a plethora of cases reaching the Court,
there is still debate about the extent of the protection commercial speech deserves. The
Central Hudson test, which was believed to be an “end all” test, has metamorphosed and
is still under attack. However, many guiding principles have emerged from the [Virginia
Pharmacy] progeny which will be useful in determining whether commercial speech . . .
can be regulated.
Id. See also Sean P. Costello, Comment, Strange Brew: The State of Commercial Speech
Jurisprudence Before and After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681
(1997) (examining the impact of 44 Liquormart on the commercial speech doctrine and discussing
why strict scrutiny should have been applied).
74. See infra Part IV.
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts
In November of 1998, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
entered into a settlement agreement with major manufacturers in the
tobacco industry.75 This agreement, known as the Master Settlement
Agreement (MSA),76 settled pending claims77 against the tobacco
manufacturers in exchange for monetary and injunctive relief.78
However, the Massachusetts Attorney General felt that the MSA did not

75. Alan E. Scott, Article, The Continuing Tobacco War: State and Local Tobacco Control in
Washington, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2000). Forty-six other states entered into the
agreement as well. Id.
76. See generally Robert L. Kline, Tobacco Advertising After the Settlement: Where We Are
and What Remains to be Done, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 621 (2000) (discussing the Master
Settlement Agreement); Lori Ann Luka, Note, The Tobacco Industry and the First Amendment: An
Analysis of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 297 (1999-2000) (analyzing
the Master Settlement Agreement under Central Hudson’s four-part test); Walter Henry Clay
Mckay, Reaping the Tobacco Settlement Windfall: The Viability of Future Settlement Payment
Securitization as an Option for State Legislatures, 52 ALA. L. REV. 705 (2001) (discussing the
terms of the Master Settlement Agreement and the problems involved in securitzation of the
payment).
77. See generally Scott, supra note 75, at 1100. According to Scott, the tobacco industry had
been able to defeat private lawsuits for a number of years. Id. However, plaintiffs’ attorneys had
begun to discover damaging documents, which proved the tobacco industry was partially to blame
for many tobacco related deaths. Id. According to Scott:
Perhaps the most damaging new weapon . . . was the availability of new internal tobacco
company documents that came to light through previous litigation and tobacco-industry
whistleblowers. These documents revealed that the tobacco [industry] had been aware of
the detrimental health effects of smoking since at least 1953, had suppressed the results
of internal research, and had deliberately attempted to create doubt and controversy
about the health effects of smoking in the minds of the American public.
Id. (citations omitted). New lawsuits began to emerge and the states began to sue the tobacco
industry “to reclaim medical expenses . . . spent on tobacco related illnesses.” Id.
78. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 533 (2001). In general:
[The settlement agreement banned] all advertising using cartoons, but not human
figures . . . . Tobacco ads on billboards, buses, and subway cars [were] banned, but
outdoor ads smaller than fourteen square feet [were] permitted. Tobacco advertising in
sports arenas and venues [were] banned, but tobacco companies [were] each allowed to
sponsor one sporting event a year for each brand they manufacture. The tobacco
companies agreed not to target youth, but [would] print no additional and unequivocal
health warnings on their packages.
In the [settlement agreement], the participating manufacturers and the attorneys
general state they [were] “committed to reducing underage tobacco use.” To that end the
[agreement] set unit minimums of twenty cigarettes per pack and limited free gifts and
samples. However, no provisions regulate[d] self-service displays, point-of-sale
advertising, or vending machines.
Scott, supra note 75, at 1103 (citations omitted, emphasis added).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003

13

Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 4
KELLER1.DOC

146

1/6/03 2:47 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:133

address all pertinent tobacco-related issues.79 Accordingly, the Attorney
General created the regulations at the center of the Lorillard litigation.80
These regulations attempted to restrict “outdoor advertising, point-ofsale advertising, retail sales transactions, transactions by mail,
promotions, sampling of products, and labels for cigars.”81
B. Procedural History
1. District Court — First Ruling (Preemption)
The Lorillard litigation began when the Plaintiffs82 (hereinafter
“Tobacco Companies”) filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, seeking a determination as to whether the
Massachusetts regulations83 had been preempted by federal law.84 The
79. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 533:
At the press conference covering Massachusetts’ decision to sign the agreement, thenAttorney General Scott Harshbarger announced that as one of his last acts in office, he
would create consumer protection regulations to restrict advertising and sales practices
for tobacco products. He explained that the regulations were necessary in order to “close
holes” in the settlement agreement . . . .
Id.
80. Id. at 533-34. In 1999, the regulations were created pursuant to the Attorney General’s
authority under the Massachusetts General Laws, ch. 93A, § 2 (1997). Id. at 533. This act prevents
unfair or deceptive trade practices. Id. The regulations promulgated under the Massachusetts
General Laws restricted advertising practices in an effort to prevent adolescents from using
cigarettes, cigars, and smokeless tobacco. Id.
81. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 534.
82. The plaintiffs in Lorillard were: Lorillard Tobacco Company, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company, Philip Morris Incorporated, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, and United
States Tobacco Company. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 76 F. Supp. 2d 124 (D. Mass. 1999).
83. First, the Tobacco Companies challenged the provision that outlawed tobacco advertising
if visible from the outdoors and if located within one thousand feet of public playgrounds,
playground areas in public parks, elementary schools, or secondary schools. Id. at 127-28. Second,
the Tobacco Companies challenged the provision that outlawed all tobacco advertising placed
below five feet from the floor in stores if those stores were located within one thousand feet of
public playgrounds, playgrounds areas in public parks, elementary schools, or secondary schools
and if minors would have access to the stores. Id. at 128. This type of advertising is known as
“ground-level advertising.” Id. Third, the Tobacco Companies challenged the provision that
outlawed promotional techniques like samplings, give-aways, mail distributions, and non-tobacco
gifts given in consideration of purchase, without first verifying age. Id. Lastly, the Tobacco
Companies challenged the provision that allowed retailers only one black and white, five hundred
and seventy-six square inch sign outside, which could state only the phrase “Tobacco Products Sold
Here.” Id. This type of advertising is known as “tombstone advertising.” Lorillard, 76 F. Supp. 2d
at 128. For the full text of the Massachusetts regulations, see 940 C.M.R. §§ 21.01 – 22.09 (2002).
84. Id. at 127. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act contains an express
provision requiring pre-emption. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994). The full text of this section is as
follows:
(a) Additional statements
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district court found that only the tombstone advertising provision was
preempted.85 Furthermore, the court expressly refused to address any
potential speech-related issues, stating that it intended “no intimation
whatsoever concerning the First Amendment issues presented in [the]
case.”86
2. District Court — Second Ruling (The First Amendment)
After an unfavorable decision on preemption grounds, the Tobacco
Companies returned, seeking a declaration that the regulations were
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.87 This time, the Tobacco
Companies were joined by several cigar manufacturers (hereinafter
“Cigar Companies”) who also sought to have the regulations declared
unconstitutional.88 The court first examined the regulations as they
applied to the Tobacco Companies.89 Before beginning its analysis, the
court held that Central Hudson was the appropriate standard of review.90
No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section
1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) State regulations
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State
law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which
are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.
15 U.S.C § 1334.
85. Lorillard, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 133. The court stated it was pre-empted because it prevented
“the Tobacco Companies from making a statement concerning the relationship between smoking
and health.” Id. See generally Lee Gordon Dunst, Federal Preemption: The Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act and Tort Claims Challenging the Adequacy of Cigarette Warnings,
1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 459 (1991) (discussing the problem of preemption as it relates to cigarette
advertising); Harold C. Reeder, Lindsey v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Department: Cipollone
Revisited, Billboards, State Law Tort Damages Actions, Federal Preemption and the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 24 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 763 (2001) (discussing the doctrine
of preemption and examining case law on the issue of preemption and cigarette advertising).
86. Lorillard, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 134.
87. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 84 F. Supp. 2d 180, 182 (D. Mass. 2000), reversed in
part by Consolidated Cigar Co. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2000), reversed in Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
88. The cigar manufacturers were: Consolidated Cigar Corporation, General Cigar Company,
Havatampa, John Middleton, L.J. Peretti Company, Swedish Match North America, Swisher
International, and Tobacco Exporters International (NSA), Ltd. Id. at 180.
89. Id. at 183.
90. Id. at 185. The district court dismissed the Tobacco Companies request for a heightened
standard of review. Id. The Tobacco Companies felt that their case was analogous to the advertiser
in Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Id. at 184. In Carey, the Supreme Court
held it was unconstitutional for the state of New York to prohibit the advertisement of
contraceptives. 431 U.S. at 700. The Court found heightened scrutiny must be applied when a
fundamental interest is involved. See id. at 688. Furthermore, the Court found that a state could
only surpass this heightened scrutiny by showing a “compelling” state interest, advanced by a
narrowly drawn regulation. Id. In Lorillard, the district court stated that the Tobacco Companies
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The court reasoned the first prong of Central Hudson was satisfied;
the advertising qualified for protection because it did not incite illegal
activity.91 It also decided that the asserted government interest —
preventing underage smoking — was substantial, thus meeting the
second prong of the test.92 The court also found the third prong of the
test was met because the regulations directly advanced the government
interest.93 Finally, the court determined all of the regulations passed the

“closest companions are pornographers” because both offer services, which although legal, are
recreational and not “fundamental.” 84 F. Supp. 2d at 184. The court also distinguished Carey on
the ground that the regulations in Carey sought a complete ban of all advertising, an activity the
state could not regulate. Id. According to the Court, the regulations at issue in Lorillard concerned
“place and manner” only. Id. at 185. Although the court did acknowledge that under a different set
of circumstances, such as a complete ban on advertising, the heightened scrutiny of Carey could be
invoked. Id. Moreover, the court noted “[s]moking presents no . . . underlying constitutional
concerns.” Id.
91. Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 185-86. The Attorney General was willing to pass on this
point, and not argue that cigarette advertising induced illegal activity. Id.
92. Id. at 186. The court also agreed with the Attorney General’s citation to Penn Advert. of
Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), where the
Fourth Circuit “found that promoting compliance with the state prohibition of the sale of cigarettes
to minors was a substantial governmental interest under Central Hudson.” Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d
at 186. It did not agree with the Tobacco Companies’ attempt to show no substantial governmental
interest by citing to 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, because that case dealt with a state ban on
liquor price advertising. Id. at 186. The court distinguished 44 Liquormart on the grounds it
attempted to impose a “vice” characterization on an activity with respect to adult consumers,
whereas the Massachusetts regulations attempted only to prevent an illegal activity — underage
smoking. Id.
93. Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 187. The court acknowledged that no governmental interest
can justify legislation that does not directly advance its interest. Id. at 186. However, the District
Court stated “[t]his requirement may be satisfied by the submission of surveys, studies, and even
anecdotal evidence.” Id. (citing Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 627-29 (1995)).
Furthermore, the court stated such things as history and common sense could support the a finding
that the regulation advances the asserted interest. Id. (quoting Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515
U.S. at 628). Here, the Attorney General cited cases that showed a “common-sense” connection
between advertising and smoking, and he cited reports showing that link. Id. at 186-87. The court
discounted the Tobacco Companies’ assertion that the Attorney General’s evidence was insufficient.
Id. at 187-89. The Tobacco Companies argued the Attorney General’s evidence did not satisfy
Central Hudson because it relied too much on common sense. Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 188.
The court dismissed this argument, stating “[s]everal studies, and common sense, show a link
between advertising and smoking.” Id. (emphasis added). The Tobacco Companies challenged the
accuracy and conclusions of the studies the Attorney General cited. Id. They argued that there was
no evidence advertising was the “sole cause” of adolescent tobacco use and they argued there was
no “conclusive proof” advertising causes people to start smoking. Id. The court found there was a
“solid body of research demonstrating the link between advertising and the incidence of smoking”
to support the Attorney General’s position. Id. Furthermore, the court noted “[t]he government is
not “required to satisfy the causal relationship by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. Rather, it
stated the government only had to prove the evidence made it “objectively reasonable” to believe
that the asserted regulation would advance its goal. Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 189 (citations
omitted).
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fourth prong of Central Hudson, with the exception of the point-of-sale
regulations, because those were not narrowly tailored.94
The Cigar Companies also challenged the regulations requiring
additional warning labels95 and restricting certain retail sales practices.96
The only difference between the Cigar Companies’ arguments and
Tobacco Companies’ arguments was the Cigar Companies’ argument
that the First Amendment analysis should be different for cigars.97 In
addressing these arguments, the court focused only on the last two
prongs of Central Hudson.98 It looked at whether the regulations
directly served the asserted government interest, and whether the
regulations were more extensive than necessary.99
In determining whether the regulations advanced the governmental
interest, the court noted that the Attorney General could not regulate
cigars in the same manner as cigarettes, unless he could show “how
regulation of [a] distinguishable product also materially advances the
governmental interest.”100 Ultimately, the court held the regulation of
cigars did directly advance the government’s interest.101 However, the
94. Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 193. On this point, the court found that the Attorney General
had failed to show the regulation was narrowly tailored “because its sole justification for the
selection of a [one thousand] foot zone relates to conclusions by a federal agency concerning
outdoor advertising.” Id. (emphasis in original). Noting it is not the position of the judiciary to
choose the proper number, the court held the Attorney General could not prove the one thousand
foot zone was narrowly tailored for indoor advertising purposes by relying on administrative
conclusions that picked that number for outdoor advertising purposes. Id. at 192-93.
95. Id. at 193. The warnings were to inform consumers about the heath risks associated with
cigar smoking, that cigars are addictive, and that cigars are not a safe alternative to cigarette
smoking. Id.
96. Id. at 195. The Cigar Companies argued the restriction on the physical locations of cigars
in retail stores and the restrictions on promotions and sampling also violated the First Amendment.
Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 195-96. The court dismissed these arguments by stating “[t]hese
concerns are not properly examined under a First Amendment analysis because they do not
implicate speech or expression.” Id. at 195. The court stated the fact that consumers like to handle
cigars is not a First Amendment issue. Id. The court found this to be a “characteristic of the
commodity” and not an indication of protected expression. Id. The court also noted that if the
restrictions against promotional giveaways and samplings were prevented, then every commercial
transaction in the country would be implicated “because any sale or giveaway of a product
inherently conveys information about [the] product itself.” Id.
97. Id. at 193. Mainly, the Cigar Companies argued cigars are different because: (1) cigar
manufacturers advertise relatively little compared to cigarette manufacturers, (2) the Food and Drug
Administration does not include cigars in its regulations because the evidence does not show that
minors smoke cigars, (3) cigar manufacturers do not advertise by billboard and they do not advertise
a lot in magazines or newspapers, and (4) consumers like to feel, smell, and look at cigars before
they purchase them. Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 193-94.
98. Id. at 194.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 195. The court stated that the Attorney General had proved cigarettes and cigars
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court found the evidence insufficient to justify the point-of-sale
restriction and the restriction on retail sales practices.102 As to the
challenge on the additional warning label requirement, the court found
that it was constitutional because it advanced the state’s interest and was
narrowly tailored.103
3. The Appeal
On appeal, both the Tobacco Companies and the Cigar Companies
advanced the same arguments presented to the lower court.104 The First
Circuit affirmed the district court on the preemption issue.105 On the
First Amendment issue, the circuit court also agreed that Central
Hudson was the appropriate test.106 The court then followed the Central
Hudson analysis, much like the lower court.107 However, it ultimately
had many similarities. Id. Furthermore, the court stated the “Attorney General should not have to
wait until there is a new epidemic of underage cigar smokers in order to enact regulations intended
to prevent that very epidemic.” Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 195.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 198. The court found the third prong of Central Hudson was “easy to satisfy in the
context of product warnings.” Id. at 197 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)). As to the
fourth prong of Central Hudson, the court found the requirement narrowly tailored and dismissed
the Cigar Companies’ argument that the warning labels were burdensome. Id. at 198.
104. Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2000) (per curiam), reversed
in part by Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). The Attorney General crossappealed the district court’s decision regarding the indoor advertising restriction. Id.
105. Id. at 41.
106. Id. at 42. “[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that even regulations which single out the
promotional speech of a particular industry are analyzed under the Central Hudson test.” Id. (citing
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999)). The court also
rejected the argument that the regulations constitute viewpoint discrimination. Id. “Under these
circumstances, we do not see the danger of viewpoint discrimination . . . and we decline to impose a
higher level of review on such basis.” Id. But see Tommy Sangchompuphen, Stripping United
States v. Playboy Entm’t Group Down to the Bare Essential: Why Keeping Abreast of First
Amendment Issues in Developing Technology Requires Predictability and a Return to Strict
Scrutiny, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 81 (1999) (arguing strict scrutiny is needed to uphold First
Amendment safeguards in cases where the regulations are content-based).
107. The court assumed, but did not explore the first prong of the test — whether the speech
concerns lawful activity. Consolidated, 218. F.3d at 43. Concerning the second prong, the court
found the state’s interest was substantial. Id. at 44. The court dismissed the argument made by the
Tobacco and Cigar Companies that “Massachusetts cannot have a substantial interest in depriving
consumers of truthful information in a paternalistic effort to protect them by ‘keeping them in the
dark.’” Id. The court agreed with the statement as it related to adults, but stated the government has
greater power when it comes to children. Id. With regard to the third prong, the court found the
Massachusetts regulations directly advanced the state’s interest. Id. Looking to the Supreme Court
for guidance, the circuit court analyzed whether the regulations addressed “real” harms and
alleviated them to a “material” degree. Id. (citing Greater New Orleans Broad., 527 U.S. at 188).
The court felt the Attorney General established there is a risk of harm from underage tobacco use,
including cigars and smokeless tobacco. Consolidated, 218 F.3d at 45. The court also felt the
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reversed the district court, finding that all of the restrictions were
narrowly tailored.108 The court summarily dismissed all of the other
First Amendment arguments the parties presented.109 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to hear arguments on both issues.110
C. United States Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
The regulations before the Supreme Court were the outdoor
advertising and point-of-sale advertising restrictions.111 The Cigar
Companies also challenged the regulation that made it unlawful to have
samplings and promotional giveaways, and unlawful to have self-service
displays within the reach of the consumer.112 The Court first considered
the preemption issue and reversed the First Circuit.113 It held that the
regulations were preempted because “Congress prohibited state cigarette
advertising regulations that were motivated by concerns about smoking
and health.”114 However, despite finding that the regulations were
preempted, the Court still had to decide the First Amendment issues.115
Attorney General’s “common sense argument on the causal relationship between advertising and
product use” carried the burden of proving that the Massachusetts regulations would alleviate the
“harm” to a “material degree.” Id. at 47-48. The court summarized its analysis of the third prong of
Central Hudson, stating “[l]ess advertising may reasonably be expected to reduce the consumption
of tobacco products by current users, insofar as there will be fewer reminders to stop at the store and
pick up a pack of cigarettes, a can of smokeless tobacco, or a cigar. . . .” Id. at 49.
108. The Circuit Court stated the one thousand foot regulation did not need to be a “perfect
fit.” Id. at 50. According to the court, Central Hudson only requires a “reasonable fit.” Id.
109. Id. at 51-53. Namely, both the Tobacco Companies and the Cigar Companies argued
Massachusetts should more strictly enforce its current laws prohibiting tobacco sales to minors, that
the regulations did not leave open ample alternative modes of communication, and that the
regulations were not sufficiently tailored. Consolidated, 218 F.3d at 51-53. The Cigar Companies
and manufacturers of smokeless tobacco also argued the restrictions on self-service displays
violated the First Amendment. Id. However, the circuit court found this was not “speech” within
the meaning of the First Amendment. Id. The court declined to answer whether the sale of highend cigars was protected commercial speech finding that “the regulations pass muster under Central
Hudson even assuming arguendo that the commercial speech analysis applies.” Id. at 54 (emphasis
in original). With respect to the warning requirement for cigars, the court affirmed the district court
for “substantially” the same reasons. Id.
110. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 531 U.S. 1068 (2001) (order granting certiorari to hear
the issues); Altadis U.S.A. Inc. v. Reilly, 531 U.S. 1068 (2001) (order granting certiorari to hear the
issues).
111. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 534 (2001).
112. Id. at 535.
113. Id. at 551.
114. Id. at 548 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 533. This is because the FCLAA’s pre-emption provision only applies to cigarettes,
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Consistent with both lower courts, the Supreme Court rejected the
argument that strict scrutiny should apply.116 The Court quickly
dispensed with the first two prongs of Central Hudson, and found that
only the third and fourth prongs were at issue.117 It then addressed
whether the outdoor advertising and point-of-sale restrictions for
smokeless tobacco and cigars directly advanced the government interest,
and whether they were narrowly tailored.118
The Court found that the Attorney General satisfied the third prong
of Central Hudson for the outdoor advertising restrictions by relying on
its previous cases,119 and on the Attorney General’s citations to studies
supporting the correlation between advertising and tobacco use.120 The
Court reasoned that the evidence proved the regulations were based on
more than just “mere speculation and conjecture.”121 However, the
Court still determined that the Attorney General failed to satisfy the
fourth prong of Central Hudson.122 The Court stated the regulations
were not a “reasonable fit between the means and the ends of the
regulatory scheme.”123 Moreover, it ascertained that the regulations were
not cigars or smokeless tobacco. Id. The Court was also forced to examine the First Amendment
issues for the Tobacco Companies because they did not raise the issue of pre-emption for the
restrictions on sales practices. Id.
116. Id. at 554-55. (“[W]e see no need to break new ground. . . . Central Hudson, as applied
in our more recent cases, provides an adequate basis for decision”) (citing Greater New Orleans
Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999)). But see Clara Sue Ross, Comment,
Pushing Puffing Post-Posadas, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1461 (1988) (arguing that even if Central
Hudson continues to be the standard it should be strictly applied).
117. Lorillard, 533 U.S at 555. As to the first two prongs, the Court noted that the parties
agreed the speech was entitled to First Amendment protection, and the government had a substantial
interest in preventing minors from using tobacco. Id.
118. Id.
119. The Court stated “[i]n previous cases we have acknowledged the theory that product
advertising stimulates the demand for products, while suppressed advertising may have the opposite
effect.” Id. at 557 (citations omitted).
120. Id. The Court relied in large part on the FDA’s findings, which consisted of various
studies that showcased the affects of tobacco advertising on children. Id. at 557-59. Although the
Court acknowledged the evidence showing the correlation between advertising and the use of cigars
by children was lacking, it found that the third prong of Central Hudson was satisfied by other
indications that cigar use by minors was increasing and that there was a link between cigar
advertising and demand. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 560.
121. Id. at 561 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)).
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 569
(1980)). The main reason was that the regulations, in some areas, would constitute almost complete
ban of tobacco advertising. Id. at 562. The Court found “[t]he breadth and scope of the regulations,
and the process by which the Attorney General adopted the [Massachusetts] regulations, do not
demonstrate a careful calculation of the speech interests involved.” Id. At the heart of this
statement was the fact the one thousand foot restriction was inappropriate for every area. See
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 562-63. According to the Court, the effect of such a regulation will vary
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more extensive than necessary to accomplish the stated goals.124 The
Court next examined the point-of-sale regulations and held that the
Attorney General had failed to satisfy both the third and fourth prongs of
Central Hudson.125
Next, the Court addressed the retail sales practices as they applied
to all tobacco products.126 Namely, the Court addressed those
regulations that banned self-service displays and those that required
tobacco products to be placed out of the consumer’s reach.127 The Court
upheld all of these restrictions, reasoning that they withstood First
Amendment scrutiny because the state’s interest was “unrelated to the
communication of ideas.”128 Overall, the Court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
its decision.129

depending on the locale, and it should be tailored for that reason. See id. at 563. The Court also
found the “range of communications” was too broad. Id. The Court pointed to the portion of the
regulations that banned oral communications and found that it was not clear why such a ban would
be necessary. Id. The Court also found the regulations restricting the size of signs were overbroad.
Id. As to these overbroad regulations, the Court noted the circuit court had “failed to follow through
with an analysis of the countervailing First Amendment interests.” Id. at 564. It placed a great deal
of emphasis on the rights of the tobacco retailers and manufacturers in conveying information about
their product to adults, and the corresponding rights of adults to receive that information. Lorillard,
533 U.S. at 564.
124. Id. at 565. The Court stated “a speech regulation cannot unduly impinge on the speaker’s
ability to propose a commercial transaction and the adult listener’s opportunity to obtain
information about products.” Id.
125. Id. at 566. The Court found the regulation did not support the government’s stated
purpose to the degree required by Central Hudson. Id. Citing Central Hudson, the Court stated that
a regulation must fail if it offers only “ineffective or remote support” for the government’s stated
purpose. Id. The Court also noted:
[T]he State’s goal is to prevent minors from using tobacco products and to curb demand
for that activity by limiting youth exposure to advertising. The [five] foot rule does not
seem to advance that goal. Not all children are less than five feet tall, and those who are
certainly have the ability to look up and take in their surroundings.
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 566. The Court recognized the Attorney General may well have a valid
interest in preventing “displays that entice children,” but that a “blanket height restriction does not
constitute a reasonable fit with that goal.” Id. at 567.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 569 (citation omitted). The Court further stated “[t]he means chosen by the State
are narrowly tailored to prevent access to tobacco products by minors, are unrelated to expression,
and leave open alternative means for vendors to convey information about their products and for
would-be customers to inspect products before purchase.” Id. at 570.
129. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 571.
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2. Justice Thomas’ Concurring Opinion130
Justice Thomas concurred in the majority opinion because he
agreed with the resolution of the preemption issue and that the
regulations failed Central Hudson.131 However, he disagreed with the
Majority’s application of the commercial speech doctrine to the
Massachusetts regulations.132 Not only did Justice Thomas feel the
regulations were incorrectly classified as commercial speech,133 but also
that the regulations were more than “time, place and manner”
restrictions.134 Relying heavily on his concurring opinion in 44
130. Several other justices filed separate opinions. Id. at 571-605. First, Justice Kennedy,
joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Id. at 571. Justice
Kennedy felt the outdoor advertising restrictions were overbroad enough to invalidate them on that
ground alone. Id. As a result, he felt there was no need to analyze the regulations under the third
prong of Central Hudson. Id. Moreover, he expressed doubt over the Court’s affirming Central
Hudson as the appropriate level of scrutiny in light of the objections made by Justice Thomas. Id.
Justice Souter concurred in part and dissented in part. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 590. He felt the case
should be remanded for trial regarding the constitutionality of the one thousand foot restriction. Id.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, and joined in part by Justice Souter,
dissented. Id. at 591. They found that the FCLAA does not prevent states from regulating the
location of advertising. Id. Justice Stevens felt the decision should be vacated as to the outdooradvertising restrictions because the record “[did] not enable [the Court] to adjudicate the merits of
those claims on summary judgment.” Id. As to the point-of-sale restrictions, Justice Stevens would
have upheld them, finding no significant First Amendment concerns. Id.
131. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 572.
132. Id. According to Justice Thomas, “when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech
in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in
question may be characterized as ‘commercial.’” Id. (citation omitted). But see Ralph W. Johnson,
III, Comment, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board:
The Demise of New York’s Son of Sam Law and the Decision that Could Have Been, 2 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 193, *4 (1992) (arguing the overuse of strict scrutiny will dilute
it and make it less effective). Johnson states:
[R]eliance [on strict scrutiny] creates the possibility that the protection of strict scrutiny
will be “diluted.” The notion of content-based regulations can be more precisely divided
into subject-matter restrictions and viewpoint-based discriminations. It is the latter that
is the most consistent with the fundamental purpose of the First Amendment and
therefore requires the most stringent review.
Id. at *16 (citation omitted).
133. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 574. Justice Thomas briefly outlines the commercial speech
doctrine and notes the Court has “followed an uncertain course” in its application of the doctrine,
due in large part to the “malleability” of the Central Hudson test. Id. Observing that there is no
“philosophical or historical” basis for lowering the scrutiny for commercial speech, Justice Thomas
expresses doubt over “whether it is even possible to draw a coherent distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech.” Id. at 575 (citing Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s
Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990)).
134. Id. at 573. Acknowledging that the Court has previously upheld time, place and manner
restrictions as zoning restrictions, Justice Thomas states the “abiding characteristic of valid time,
place, and manner restrictions is their content neutrality.” Id. The Massachusetts regulations,
Justice Thomas notes, are not concerned with “secondary effects,” but rather, with the primary
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Liquormart v. Rhode Island,135 Justice Thomas argued that the
Massachusetts regulations sought “to suppress speech about tobacco
because [the government] object[ed] to the content of [the] speech.”136
Justice Thomas contended that because the Court had “consistently
applied strict scrutiny” to content-based regulations, it should have done
so in Lorillard.137 Furthermore, he stated the asserted governmental
interest was “per se” illegitimate because the regulations sought to keep
“people ignorant by suppressing expression.”138 Justice Thomas stated
that even if the commercial speech doctrine was applicable, “the
government may not engage in content discrimination for reasons
unrelated to those characteristics of the speech that place it within [that]
category.”139 According to Justice Thomas, the commercial speech
doctrine should be limited to those regulations that address the
“commercial harms that commercial speech can threaten.”140
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Regulations Aimed at Keeping the Public Ignorant Deserve Strict
Judicial Scrutiny
Justice Thomas is correct in concluding that content-based
regulations should not be analyzed under Central Hudson.141 Certain
regulations, such as the Massachusetts regulations in Lorillard, are

effect of inducing those who view the tobacco advertisements to purchase the products. Id. at 574.
See supra note 16 (noting the use of the term “content-based” in this Note refers to those regulations
that are normally subjected to strict scrutiny in order to protect First Amendment guarantees).
135. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas J., concurring in
part, and concurring in the judgement) (arguing Central Hudson does not apply where the
regulations are per se illegitimate).
136. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 574.
137. Id. at 574. (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994)).
138. Id. (quoting 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J. concurring in part and concurring
in judgment)). Moreover, Justice Thomas stated content-based discrimination cannot be analyzed
under reduced scrutiny merely because it can be labeled commercial speech. See id. at 576.
139. Id.
140. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 576 (emphasis in original). An example would be regulations that
address the risks of deceptive and misleading advertising — not those that regulate the content. Id.
According to Thomas, “[w]hatever power the State may have to regulate commercial speech, it may
not use that power to limit the content of commercial speech . . . . Such content-discriminatory
regulation — like all other content-based regulation of speech — must be subjected to strict
scrutiny.” Id. at 577.
141. But see Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554-55. Generally, “[r]egulations which permit the
Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the
First Amendment.” Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984) (citation omitted).
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content-based regardless of their somewhat commercial nature.142
Moreover, the aim of such regulations is to keep people ingnorant of
ideas that are considered harmful or socially inappropriate by preventing
access to such information.143 Because of the potential to keep people
ignorant, several justices have opined that Central Hudson is not always
the appropriate test to apply.144 However, the Court has yet to move
away from Central Hudson and apply strict scrutiny to regulations of a
“commercial nature.”145 Nevertheless, the Court needs to recognize that
strict scrutiny is the appropriate test when the government seeks to
regulate the content of speech.146
1. Content-Based Regulations Must Pass Strict Scrutiny
The Massachusetts regulations in Lorillard are content-based
because they seek to prohibit access to information about tobacco.147 If
a regulation is content-based, it is presumed unconstitutional and subject
142. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 574 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgement).
143. Id. at 575. Cf. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (discussing First
Amendment protection of all ideas). According to the Court in Roth:
The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people . . . .
...
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance – unorthodox ideas,
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion – have the full
protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited
area of more important interests.
Id. (citations omitted).
144. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554. (citations omitted). According to the Lorillard Court,
“[s]everal Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and
whether it should apply in particular cases.” Id. (citations omitted). However, the Lorillard Court
found no “need to break new ground.” Id.
145. See id. The Court, looking at its recent commercial speech cases, found that the Central
Hudson test is “adequate.” Id. at 555 (citing Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United
States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999)).
146. It is important to note “that the government’s ability to impose content-based burdens on
speech raises the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from
the marketplace.” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 116 (1991). According to the Supreme Court:
The constitutional right of free expression is . . . intended to remove governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall
be voiced largely into the hands of each of us . . . in the belief that no other approach
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice . . . .
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1991) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24
(1971)).
147. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 574. (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgement).
According to Justice Thomas, the regulations are content-based because they seek “to suppress
speech about tobacco because [the government] objects to the content of that speech.” Id.
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to strict scrutiny.148 The Lorillard Court should have made a
determination as to whether or not the regulations were content-based.149
Apparently, the Court felt because there was a commercial nature to the
speech, it was unnecessary to consider a content-based analysis.150
However, by comparing Lorillard to other content-based regulations, it
becomes clear the Massachusetts regulations were content-based and
that strict scrutiny should have been applied.151
a. Ward v. Rock Against Racism
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court was forced to decide
whether a municipal noise regulation was facially invalid.152 Because
content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions are subject to a lower
148. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
149. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 555. The threshold question that needs to be asked is whether a
regulation is content-based. Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 883, 910 (1991). Galloway argues:
Content-based infringements fall into several categories. First, infringements directed at
[a] claimant’s point of view are content-based. Second, infringements directed at the
subject matter of the communication are content-based. Third, infringements directed at
[a] claimant’s choice of words are content-based. Fourth, infringements directed at [a]
claimant’s identity are content-based.
Fifth, infringements directed at the
“communicative impact” of [a] claimant’s conduct are content-based.
Id. (citations omitted) The Massachusetts regulations are content-based because they are directed at
both the subject matter (tobacco) and the communicative impact of the speech (youth smoking).
See 940 CMR §§ 21.01 – 22.09 (2002).
150. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554. The Lorillard Court merely quoted Central Hudson for the
proposition that there is a “distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which
occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulations, and other varieties of speech.” Id.
(quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562). The Court performed no analysis to determine whether
the regulations were content-based, other than stating that Central Hudson was the appropriate test.
See id.
151. See infra notes 152-184 and accompanying text.
152. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789 (1989). In Ward, the city of New York
enacted a municipal ordinance, which required those who performed in the bandshell, an
amphitheater in Central Park, to use certain city furnished equipment and personnel designed to
minimize the volume of amplified music. Id. at 787. Respondent, Rock Against Racism, had put
on concerts in the bandshell in the years prior to the enactment of the ordinance. Id. at 784.
However, it filed suit when it learned that its upcoming concert would be subject to the new
ordinance. Id. at 787. The Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an
injunction, which permitted the Respondent to use its own sound equipment instead of the city’s.
Id. After the concert, Respondent sought to have the ordinance struck down as facially invalid. Id.
at 788. The district court upheld the guidelines allowing the city to require use of it’s own
equipment. Id. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that content-neutral
regulations are permissible as long as the regulation is reasonable. Id. at 789. The appellate court
also found that the regulation must be as least restrictive as possible, but found that in this case the
city did not use the least restrictive means. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the ordinance
was valid on its face and that the appellate court erred by requiring the city prove that the regulation
was the least restrictive means. Id. at 789-90.
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level of judicial scrutiny,153 the Court initially inquired as to whether the
regulations were content-based.154 First, the Court noted the controlling
consideration in making this determination is the government’s
purpose.155 Second, it noted the regulation must be “justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech.”156 The Ward Court, in
applying this two-part test, found that the ordinance at issue was not
content-based.157 However, the respondent’s First Amendment rights
were sufficiently protected because the Court made a content-based
determination before choosing which level of judicial scrutiny to
apply.158
In Lorillard, the government’s purpose in enacting the regulations
was to keep “people ignorant by suppressing expression. . . .”159 The
regulations were created to keep minors from viewing tobacco
advertising, in order to further the primary purpose of preventing
underage smoking.160 However, the regulations are not “justified”
without reference to the content of the speech because they are
specifically limited to tobacco.161 Accordingly, if the Lorillard Court
153. See supra note 32 (discussing the level of judicial scrutiny afforded to content-neutral
regulations).
154. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. According to the Court, “[t]he principal inquiry in determining
content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys.” Id. (citing Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
295 (1984)).
155. Id. “A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed
neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages, but not others.” Id.
(citations omitted).
156. Id. (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
157. Ward, 491 U.S. at 792. According to the Court, the government’s purpose was to: (1)
control noise, and to (2) “avoid undue intrusion into residential areas and other areas of the park.”
Id. The Court noted the regulations had nothing to do with the content of the speech. Id.
158. But see, Johnson, supra note 132, at *18 (arguing there is a danger of diluting the
protection strict scrutiny affords when the Court applies it to anything other than viewpoint
discrimination). According to Johnson, the Court does great detriment to the First Amendment
when it protects regulations that are merely content-based subject matter restrictions. Id. Moreover,
Johnson argues that the Massachusetts regulations would not be deserving of strict scrutiny because
the regulations do not deal with political speech. See id. at *19. Cf. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (noting nothing less than strict scrutiny is appropriate when state law
burdens “core political speech”).
159. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J. concurring in part,
concurring in judgement).
160. Id. at 533. The Massachusetts Attorney General explicitly stated the purpose of the
regulations was to prevent the Tobacco Companies from recruiting new customers. Id.
161. See 940 CMR §§ 21.01 – 22.09 (2002). But see Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc.,
512 U.S. 753, 762 (1994) (finding an injunction restricting only the speech of anti-abortion
protestors was not content-based). In Madsen, the petitioners argued that an injunction specifically
directed at anti-abortion protests was content-based. Id. However, the Court found “[t]o accept
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would have gone through a content-based determination, it would likely
have found that the Massachusetts regulations failed the test set forth in
Ward.162
b. Boos v. Barry
In Boos v. Barry, the Court analyzed whether a statute prohibiting
the display of signs in front of a foreign embassy violated the First
Amendment.163 Appropriately, the Court first made a determination as
to whether the statute was content-based or content-neutral.164 In
making this determination, the Court looked at exactly what type of
speech the government was attempting to prohibit.165 The Court began
by noting that the First Amendment is hostile “to [the] prohibition of
public discussion of an entire topic.”166 The Court ultimately found the
statute was not content-neutral because it was not concerned with the
secondary effects of the prohibited speech.167 In discussing secondary

petitioners’ claim would be to classify virtually every injunction as content or viewpoint based. An
injunction, by its very nature, applies only to a particular group . . . . and perhaps the speech, of that
particular group.” Id. However, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia found the ordinance did
violate the First Amendment. Id. at 785. According to Justice Scalia, regulations that deny exercise
of free speech and apply only to “a particular group, which had broken no law, [and] to that group
and that group alone, are profoundly at odds with our First Amendment. . . .” Id.
162. See supra notes 152-161 and accompanying text. According to the Supreme Court,
“government regulation of speech must be measured in minimums, not maximums.” See Riley v.
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 790 (1988) (applying strict scrutiny to a North
Carolina statute that regulated charities). If this is true, then it stands to reason the Court should
start its analysis with a determination as to whether the regulations are content-based and work its
way down. See id.
163. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988). In Boos, the petitioners wanted to place signs in
front of foreign embassies. Id. at 315. They also wanted to be able to congregate within 500 feet of
the embassies. Id. However, the statute at issue prevented both of these activities. Id. The
petitioners brought an action challenging the statute as facially unconstitutional. Id. at 316. The
district court granted the respondent’s motion for summary judgment, and the appellate court
affirmed. Id.
164. Boos, 485 U.S. at 318. However, before deciding whether the speech was content-based,
the Court did note the speech at issue was political speech and was worthy of the most
Constitutional protection. See id.
165. Id. at 318-19. In Boos, the Court found the government was attempting to prohibit only
speech that was critical of a foreign government. Id.
166. Id. at 319 (citation omitted).
167. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321. The respondents in this case argued the statute should be upheld as
a content-neutral regulation of time, place, and manner. Id. They argued that the statute was
concerned with the secondary effects of the speech, which was protecting foreign diplomats “from
speech that offends their dignity.” Id. at 320. The Court, however, decided the statute was not
concerned with secondary effects because concern about secondary effects applies “to regulations
that apply to a particular category of speech because the regulatory targets happen to be associated
with that type of speech.” Id. (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).
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effects, the Court stated “[r]egulations that focus on the direct impact of
the speech on its audience present a different situation.”168 Moreover,
the Court held that restrictions aimed at regulating a person’s reactions
to speech are not valid because a person’s reaction to speech is not a
type of secondary effect.169
The Boos Court’s reasoning, applied to Lorillard, demonstrates that
the Massachusetts regulations are content-based and should have been
subject to strict scrutiny.170 First, the Massachusetts regulations are
aimed at preventing smoking.171 Second, they prohibit an entire
category of speech — tobacco.172 The regulations are not concerned
with secondary effects, but with the primary effect of discouraging
smoking.173 Moreover, the regulations are aimed at regulating a
person’s reactions to advertising.174 According to the Court’s decision in
Boos, such regulations are not content-based.175 Yet, the Lorillard Court
did not adopt this reasoning, presumably only because the speech was
commercial in nature.176
c. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC
In Turner, the Court decided that the constitutionality of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act’s “must carry”
168. Id. at 321.
169. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321. The Court made a comparison to its decision in Renton. Id. In
Renton, a zoning ordinance was enacted that prohibited any adult movie theaters from locating
within one thousand feet of any residential area, church, park, or school. Renton, 475 U.S. at 43.
The Renton Court found the ordinance was a content-neutral regulation of time, place, and manner.
Id. at 49. The Court noted the regulation did “not appear to fit neatly into either the ‘content-based’
or the ‘content-neutral’ category.” Id. at 47. However, because the regulation was not concerned so
much with the content of the films, but with the “undesirable secondary effects,” the Court
appropriately applied an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny. See id. at 49.
170. But see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992) (noting the First Amendment’s
protections are strongest with regard to political speech).
171. Cf. Boos, 485 U.S. at 318 (finding regulations preventing the criticism of foreign
governments are content-based).
172. Cf. Boos, 485 U.S. at 319 (noting regulations aimed a preventing an entire category of
speech are not permitted).
173. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 574 (2001) (Thomas, J. concurring in part,
concurring in judgement). “Massachusetts is not concerned with any ‘secondary effects’ of tobacco
advertising — it is concerned with the advertising’s primary effect, which is to induce those who
view the advertisements to purchase and use tobacco products.” Id.
174. Id.
175. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
176. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 575 (Thomas, J. concurring in part, concurring in judgement). “It
should be clear that if these regulations targeted anything other than advertising for commercial
products — if, for example, they were directed at billboards promoting political candidates — all
would agree that they restrictions should be subjected to strict scrutiny.” Id.
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provisions needed to be decided by “some measure of heightened First
Amendment scrutiny.”177 Before determining a proper level of judicial
scrutiny, the Court stated that “[d]eciding whether a particular regulation
is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”178 The
Court went back to its opinion in Ward and noted the principal inquiry
— whether the government seeks to regulate speech because of the
message it conveys — must be made.179 According to the Court, “[l]aws
that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on
the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based.”180 The
Court contrasted content-based regulations with content-neutral
regulations and noted content-neutral regulations do not reference ideas
or viewpoints.181
Again, if the Turner Court’s reasoning is applied to Lorillard, it
illustrates that the Lorillard Court failed to afford the Tobacco
Companies the proper measure of First Amendment protection.182 First,
the Court did not perform the “principal inquiry” to determine whether
the government was seeking to regulate the speech based on the message
conveyed.183 In fact, if the Court had made this inquiry, it would have
177. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). In Turner, the regulations
required that cable operators “must carry” certain local broadcast stations. Id. at 630. The Court
ultimately held that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate form of “heightened scrutiny.” Id. at
643. According to the Court, “[i]nsofar as they pertain to the carriage of full-power broadcasters,
the must carry rules, on their face, impose burdens and confer benefits without reference to the
content of the speech.” Id. See generally Symposium, Constitutional Substantial-Evidence
Review? Lessons from the Supreme Court’s Turner Broadcasting Decision, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
1162, 1175 (1997) (discussing the Court’s use of intermediate scrutiny in Turner).
178. Turner, 512 U.S. at 642.
179. Id. According to the Court, “The purpose, or justification, of a regulation will often be
evident on its face.” Id. (citations omitted).
180. Id. at 643 (citations omitted).
181. Id. The Court stated, “[l]aws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without
reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content neutral.” Id. See generally
Jerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flight From [the]First Amendment Doctrine:
Justice Breyer’s New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 817 (1998) (discussing
Justice Breyer’s approach in Turner and its effect on competing First Amendment interests).
182. But see Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV. 909, 95455 (1992) (arguing the First Amendment should not prevent government regulation of harmful
products). According to Law,
[A] state is free to ban advertising for products producing harmful dependence in a
substantial proportion of users. Whether a product is addictive or harmful is an
empirical question. Whether advertising for a particular product can be banned depends
upon the state’s ability to demonstrate that the particular product is harmful and likely to
produce dependence.
Id.
183. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554-55 (2001) (finding Central Hudson to
be the appropriate test and refusing to “break new ground” by applying strict scrutiny).
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found Massachusetts was attempting to regulate speech based on the
ideas and views that would have been expressed through the Tobacco
Companies’ advertising.184
2. Viewpoint Discrimination Deserves Strict Scrutiny
At the very least, the Lorillard Court should have found the
Massachusetts regulations were content-based restrictions and applied
However, the regulations arguably constitute
strict scrutiny.185
viewpoint discrimination and could have been found per se
unconstitutional.186 While the better approach would have been to apply
strict scrutiny, the Court should not have limited itself to Central
Hudson when the regulations could have failed for other reasons.187 An
184. Cf. Robinson, supra note 34, at 707 (arguing that the Turner Court failed in its analysis by
not finding the “must carry” provisions content-based restrictions on the freedom of speech).
According to Robinson, “[t]he Supreme Court incorrectly held the First Amendment intermediate
level scrutiny applicable to the must-carry provisions. The Court should have held that the
provisions warrant strict scrutiny because they are content-based regulations on speech protected by
the First Amendment.” Id. (citations omitted).
185. But see Wojciech Sadurski, Does the Subject Matter? Viewpoint Neutrality and Freedom
of Speech, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 315, 337 (1997) (arguing there is no distinction between
content-based regulations and viewpoint-based regulations unless there is a distinction between
those regulations founded on intolerance and those based on paternalism); Penelope Seator, Judicial
Indifference to Pornography’s Harm: American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 17 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 297, 302 (1987) (arguing laws prohibiting pornography should not be seen as unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination because they are aimed at social harms and not at the underlying idea).
186. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (holding a
university policy regulating the funding of newspapers was unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination). According to the Supreme Court:
[T]he state may sometimes curtail speech when necessary to advance a significant and
legitimate state interest . . . . [However], there are some purported interests – such as a
desire to suppress support for a minority party or an unpopular cause, or to exclude the
expression of certain points of view from the market place of ideas – that are so plainly
illegitimate that they would immediately invalidate the rule. The general principle that
has emerged . . . is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech
in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.
City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984).
187. But see Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints From Olympus, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 697, 697
(1996) (arguing that allowing content-based restrictions to be classified as viewpoint discrimination
may have significant impact on First Amendment law). According to Greenawalt, “[t]he Core of
the Court’s opinion [in Rosenberger] is unconvincing because it fails to elaborate a plausible
account of what constitutes viewpoint discrimination.” Id. at 697. In his criticism of the
Rosenberger opinion, he states:
Taken at face value, the Rosenberger majority . . . . undermines the distinction between
viewpoint discrimination and most other content distinctions . . . . [I]f the fact that
descriptive treatments of a subject matter from a historical or psychological perspective
are left free by some regulation is sufficient to constitute viewpoint discrimination, then
there has not yet been (and probably never will be) an instance of content discrimination
that is not viewpoint discrimination. Further, any content discrimination is likely to have
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examination of the Massachusetts regulations as compared to previously
decided cases dealing with viewpoint discrimination proves the Court
could have found the regulations per se unconstitutional.188
a. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
In R.A.V., the Court considered whether a city ordinance was
facially invalid under the First Amendment.189 The Court established
that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it prohibited speech
based solely on its subject.190 The Court further noted the regulations
amounted to viewpoint discrimination because they only proscribed hate
speech on certain topics.191 According to the Court, this was
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.192
some indirect effect of helping certain viewpoints in preference to others . . . . No
restriction on expression (content based or not) will be entirely free of influence on
acceptance of viewpoint.
Id. at 707-08.
188. But see Harvard Law Review, Viewpoint Discrimination — Funding for Religious
Publication, 109 HARV. L. REV. 210, 215 (1995) (noting viewpoint discrimination will normally be
applied to most bans on religious and political speech).
189. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992). In R.A.V., the Petitioner was
charged with violating a provision of the city code, which made it unlawful to place “on public or
private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited
to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender . . . .” Id.
See generally Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography after R.A.V., 60 U. CHI.
L. REV. 873, 874 (1993) (discussing the problems of viewpoint discrimination as they relate to
R.A.V. and discussing alternative ways for the government to regulate hate speech and
pornography).
190. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381. According to the Court, just because some categories of speech
are traditionally unprotected, does not mean “that the First Amendment imposes no obstacle
whatsoever to regulation of particular instances of such proscribable expression, so that the
government ‘may regulate [them] freely.’” Id. at 384 (alterations in original).
191. Id. at 391. The R.A.V. Court stated:
In its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even beyond mere content
discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination. Displays containing some words —
odious racial epithets, for example — would be prohibited to proponents of all views.
But, “fighting words” that do not themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or
gender — aspersions upon a person’s mother, for example — would seemingly be usable
ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc., tolerance and
equality, but could not be used by those speakers’ opponents. One could hold up a sign
saying, for example, that all “anti-Catholic bigots” are misbegotten; but not that all
“papists” are, for that would insult and provoke violence “on the basis of religion.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
192. Id. at 393-94. But see id. at 415 (Blackmun, J. concurring) (arguing that the effect of the
Court’s opinion will be to weaken First Amendment protection). According to Justice Blackmun,
the problem with the Court’s decision is: (1) if the Court is forbidden to characterize protection, for
example as fighting words or obscenity, First Amendment protection will be reduced across the
board, and (2) the case would be regarded as an “aberration,” where the Court manipulated and
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Applying this same reasoning to Lorillard, it is simple to see how
the Court could have used viewpoint discrimination as a basis for
striking down the Massachusetts regulations.193 In Lorillard, the
regulations prohibit speech based solely on the subject of the speech —
tobacco.194 Moreover, the regulations prohibit speech by narrowing it to
a certain topic — adolescents and tobacco.195 For all intents and
purposes, this was viewpoint discrimination.196 However, it would be
difficult to support the argument that the Massachusetts regulations
should be struck down under R.A.V. alone, because R.A.V. did not
clearly define what constitutes viewpoint discrimination.197 Therefore, it
is necessary to examine some of the Court’s later cases on this subject.198

created a doctrine solely for the purpose of striking down an ordinance “whose premise it opposed.”
Id. at 416. Moreover, Justice Blackmun stated, “I see no First Amendment values that are
compromised by a law that prohibits hoodlums from driving minorities out of their homes by
burning crosses on their lawns, but I see great harm in preventing the people of Saint Paul from
specifically punishing the race-based fighting words that so prejudice their community.” Id.
193. But see Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 100
(1996) (stating the prohibitions against viewpoint discrimination arise from core First Amendment
values). Heins states:
These values include the right to think, believe, and speak freely, the fostering of
intellectual and spiritual growth, and the free exchange of ideas necessary to a properly
functioning democracy. Government action that suppresses or burdens speech on the
basis of its viewpoint threatens all of these values by skewing public debate, retarding
democratic change, depriving people of ideas and artistic experiences that could
contribute to their growth, and otherwise constricting human liberty.
Id. (citations omitted). It can be argued that regulations of a commercial nature cannot be struck
down under the doctrine of viewpoint discrimination because commercial speech is a lesser form of
speech that was not based on core First Amendment values. See generally, Geoffrey R. Stone, AntiPornography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 461, 468
(1986) (noting anti-pornography legislation may be viewpoint based, but survive because it does not
pose the usual dangers associated with viewpoint discrimination).
194. Cf. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 (finding St. Paul’s ordinance prevented only the subject of
hate speech).
195. Cf. id. (holding that there was viewpoint discrimination because the ordinance prevented
only hate speech on certain topics such as race, gender, and religion).
196. See id.
197. Bruce A. Grabow, Note, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: Dismantling Free Speech
Jurisprudence to Make Room for Equal Treatment, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 577, 581 (1993)
(discussing the need for a heightened analysis after the Court’s decision in R.A.V). According to
Grabow, “[i]t is the Court’s prerogative to commission new standards for constitutional review,
[but] such discretionary decisions deserve to be analyzed closely. This need for heightened analysis
becomes even more apparent when the new approach creates more problems than it solves.” Id. at
582.
198. See infra notes 199-208 and accompanying text.
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b. Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of
Virginia
In later cases, the Court’s determination of what constitutes
viewpoint discrimination became clearer.199 In Rosenberger, the Court
stated that the government may not regulate speech based on its
content.200 According to the Court, “[w]hen the government targets not
subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the
violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.”201 More
importantly, the Court noted viewpoint discrimination is more evident
when the state seeks to regulate speech that is reasonable in light of the
forum in which it is presented.202
Under the reasoning set forth in Rosenberger, the Massachusetts
regulations would constitute viewpoint discrimination.203 First, the
regulations sought to target particular views — the acceptance of
199. See generally Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (discussing what constitutes viewpoint
discrimination). In Rosenberger, the Court determined the University of Virginia’s refusal to fund a
newspaper because of its religious content was viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 832.
200. Id. at 828. Furthermore, the Court stated that discrimination based on the message of the
speech is presumed unconstitutional. Id. However, in certain situations, the Court has held that the
government may regulate speech based on content and viewpoint. See Gitlow v. State of New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (finding a statute prohibiting criminal anarchy constitutional).
According to the Gitlow Court:
It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the
press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or
publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and
unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents
the punishment of those who abuse this freedom . . . .
That a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this
freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals,
incite to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to question.
Id. at 666-67 (citations omitted). Arguably, restrictions such as the one in Gitlow would be
unprotected under the incitement-to-riot or fighting words theories.
201. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court stated “[v]iewpoint
discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The government must abstain
from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” Id.
202. See Id. According to the Court:
[I]n determining whether the State is acting to preserve the limits of the forum it has
created so that the exclusion of a class of speech is legitimate, we have observed a
distinction between, on the one hand, content discrimination, which may be permissible
if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint
discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech
otherwise within the forum’s limitations.
Id. at 829-30.
203. See generally Helgi Walker, Note, Communications Media and the First Amendment: A
Viewpoint Neutral FCC is Not Too Much to Ask For, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 5, 6 (2000) (stating most
courts consider viewpoint discrimination to be particularly “egregious”).
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smoking.204 Second, the government sought to regulate only tobaccorelated advertising.205 According to the Rosenberger Court, this would
constitute viewpoint discrimination.206 It is easier to argue that the
Massachusetts regulations are content-based;207 nevertheless, the
regulations can be seen as viewpoint-based discrimination based on prior
Supreme Court decisions.208
B. The Commercial Speech Doctrine Needs to Be Limited To
Commercial Situations
Although doubt exists as to whether Central Hudson is always the
appropriate test, the Court has yet to “break new ground” and apply
strict scrutiny to commercial regulations.209 This is problematic because
204. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 533 (2001) (stating the Attorney
General’s purpose in creating the Massachusetts regulations was to prevent underage smoking). See
Amy Ruth Ita, Note, Censorial Community Values: An Unconstitutional Trend in Arts Funding and
Access, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1725, 1728 (2000) (discussing the use of community values to censor art
and how that is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination). Viewpoint discrimination often arises in
the case of government funding of arts. See generally Harold B. Walther, Note, National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: Sinking Deeper Into the Abyss of the Supreme Court’s
Unintelligible Modern Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 59 MD. L. REV. 225 (2000)
(discussing the Supreme Court Holding in Finley and arguing that the decision limits and suppresses
free speech). The idea behind the state’s ability to withdraw funding for certain types of art is that
the state cannot be forced to fund art that it deems indecent or disrespectful. Barry J. Heyman, The
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: The Supreme Court’s Artful Yet Indecent Proposal, 16
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 439, 446 (1999). Although state funding is not an issue in Lorillard, the
Massachusetts regulations were arguably enacted because the state sought to regulate behavior that
it thought to be inconsistent with community values. See supra Part III, notes 79-81.
205. See generally 940 CMR §§ 21.01 – 22.09 (2002).
206. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Takes a Narrow View
of Viewpoint Discrimination, 35 MAR. TRIAL 90, 91 (1999) (stating that the Supreme Court has
never defined viewpoint discrimination).
207. See supra note 185 (arguing viewpoint discrimination is not applicable to speech of a
commercial nature).
208. See supra notes 186-206 and accompanying text.
209. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554. Arguably, the commercial speech doctrine is not even
necessary because courts would have appropriate discretion in applying a strict scrutiny standard.
See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740-41 (1996)
(discussing the competing interests between the state’s interests and those of the First Amendment).
According to the Denver Court:
Over the years, [the] Court has restated and refined these basic First Amendment
principles, adopting them more particularly to the balance of competing interests and the
special circumstances of each field of application.
This tradition teaches that the First Amendment embodies an overarching
commitment to protect speech from government regulation through close judicial
scrutiny, thereby enforcing the Constitution’s constraints, but without imposing judicial
formulas so rigid that they become a straightjacket that disables the government from
responding to serious problems.
Id. (citations omitted).
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even regulations of a commercial nature can be content-based, and hence
deserving of a higher level of judicial scrutiny.210 A likely reason the
Court is hesitant to change the level of scrutiny is that commercial
speech is typically considered less deserving of constitutional
protection.211 Central Hudson, however, should not be applied unless
the regulation at issue is dealing with commercial harms.212
1. Commercial Harms
According to Justice Thomas, it is important to apply Central
Hudson only to those cases for which it was designed.213 The
commercial speech doctrine, therefore, should be limited to the
“particularly commercial harms that commercial speech can threaten . . .
.”214 This would include commercial harms, such as illegal, deceptive,
or misleading advertising.215 Alternatively, the commercial speech
doctrine should be limited to those situations that do no more than

210. But see Mary B. Nutt, Recent Development, Trends in First Amendment Protection of
Commercial Speech, 41 VAND. L. REV. 173, 174 (1988) (discussing how the Supreme Court affords
commercial speech less protection because the Court is willing to defer to the state’s judgment).
211. Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989). In Fox, the
Court was forced to determine whether speech proposing a commercial transaction was subject to
Central Hudson, where that speech was combined with non-commercial speech. Id. at 474. The
facts of the case were based on a University policy that prohibited private enterprises from soliciting
on campus. Id. at 471-72. Respondents were prohibited from having a “Tupperware party” because
of the University’s policy. Id. They argued that although there was a commercial component to the
speech, it should not be subject to a Central Hudson analysis because there was also noncommercial speech taking place. Id. at 474. The Court disagreed. Id. In noting the role the
Constitution takes in protecting commercial speech, the Court stated “[o]ur jurisprudence has
emphasized that ‘commercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with
its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,’ and is subject to ‘modes of
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.’” Id. at 477
(alteration in original) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
212. See infra notes 213-233 and accompanying text.
213. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 576 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgement).
“Even when speech falls into a category of reduced constitutional protection, the government may
not engage in content discrimination for reasons unrelated to those characteristics of the speech that
place it within the category.” Id. The point of the commercial speech doctrine is to protect truthful,
non-misleading speech even though there may be an economic motive on behalf of the speaker. See
generally Arlen W. Langvardt and Eric L. Richards, The Death of Posadas and the Birth of Change
in[sic]Commercial Speech Doctrine: Implications of 44 Liquormart, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 483 (1997)
(discussing the point of the commercial speech doctrine).
214. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 576 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgement)
(emphasis in original).
215. Id. “Whatever power the State may have to regulate commercial speech, it may not use
that power to limit the content of commercial speech as it has done here . . . . Such contentdiscriminatory regulation — like all other content-based regulation of speech — must be subjected
to strict scrutiny.” Id. at 577.
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propose a commercial transaction.216 The proper question is “not what
qualifies commercial speech for First Amendment coverage, but what, if
anything, disqualifies it?”217
a. Central Hudson Applies Only To Certain Forms of
Advertising
Certain cases would clearly qualify for Central Hudson because
they do no more than propose a commercial transaction.218 For instance,
in Virginia Pharmacy, the pharmacists sought to publish price
information about prescription drugs. This was the only message the
advertisements were transmitting.219 Similarly, in Florida Bar v. Went
For It, Inc., the lawyer advertisements sought only to solicit new
business, and no other message was transmitted.220 Because false,
deceptive, or misleading information is subject to regulation, it would
only be appropriate to apply Central Hudson to those regulations that are

216. Rodney Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive
Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 780 (1993).
Commercial speech, as speech, should presumptively enter the debate with full First
Amendment protection . . . . The argument for even reducing the level of protection to
the intermediate standard of review granted by existing First Amendment doctrine is
theoretically sound only if applied to a limited subclass of advertising: that subclass of
advertising that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.”
Id. (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976)).
217. Id.
218. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571
(1980) (holding regulation which banned advertising by utility companies violated the First
Amendment). See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622 (1995) (holding state
regulations designed to protect the privacy interests of victims did not violate the First
Amendment); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 763 (1993) (finding regulation prohibiting certified
public accountants from direct in-person solicitation was unconstitutional); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S.
191, 206-207 (1982) (holding restrictions on lawyers non-misleading speech was a violation of the
First Amendment); Virginia Pharmacy, 434 U.S. at 750 (finding state regulation prohibiting the
advertisement of prescriptions was unconstitutional).
219. Virginia Pharmacy, 434 U.S. at 760-61. See generally Glenn C. Smith, Avoiding
Awkward Alchemy — In the Off-Label Drug Context and Beyond: Fully-Protected Independent
Research Should Not Transmogrify Into Mere Commercial Speech Just Because Product
Manufacturers Distribute It, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963, 967 (1999) (arguing that mere
distribution of research by a product manufacturer should not result in the speech being treated as
commercial speech).
220. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 621. In Florida Bar, the state bar had restrictions on lawyer
advertising. Id. at 620. The restrictions prohibiting lawyers from contacting victims, “unless the
accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication.” Id.
This restriction was challenged on First Amendment grounds, but the Supreme Court upheld its
validity. Id. at 634. The basis of the Court’s decision rested upon the state’s interest in protecting
the privacy of its citizens. Id.
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designed to prevent commercial harms.221
b. Strict Scrutiny Should Otherwise Apply
While Central Hudson should apply to some forms of commercial
advertising, strict scrutiny should apply to others.222 When an advertiser
promotes more than mere prices and services, the regulations should be
subject to strict scrutiny, especially if there is a risk that the state is
seeking to prohibit the advertising on the basis of its content.223 For
instance, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., the state sought to
prohibit the unsolicited advertisement of contraceptive devices.224
Although the Court analyzed the case under Central Hudson, it would
have been more appropriate to apply strict scrutiny because the state
sought to restrict the advertisements because it did not approve of the
content.225
Similarly, in Bigelow v. Virginia, the state regulations sought to
prohibit the advertisement of abortions.226 Again, the Court analyzed the
regulation under Central Hudson, but it would have been more
appropriate to analyze it under strict scrutiny because the government’s
purpose was to prohibit speech based solely on its content.227 Because
221. See In re R.M.J. at 455 U.S. at 203 (stating truthful advertising of lawful subjects is
entitled to First Amendment protection).
222. See supra notes 141-208 and accompanying text (arguing the initial inquiry should be as
to whether the regulations are content-based).
223. See Smolla, supra note 216, at 781. According to Smolla:
To the extent that advertisers are selling fantasies, lifestyles, identity, or anything other
than ‘hard core’ transactional information, they are doing what all other speakers
routinely do. They are making these points, to be sure, out of utter self-interest; indeed,
out of the most grasping of all forms of self-interest — the desire for financial profit.
But the profit motive alone is not enough, either in First Amendment doctrine or theory,
to disqualify speech from full constitutional protection.
Id. See also New York Times Co. v. L.B. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (finding the
publication in question was not commercial because it did such things as communicate information
and express opinions); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 384 (1973) (noting speech is not commercial merely because it relates to advertising).
224. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 61 (1983).
225. See id. at 71. The government’s purpose was to: (1) protect the recipients of these
advertisements from information they may find offensive, and (2) help parents control the
information their children have access to. Id. Ultimately, the Court found the regulations were in
violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 75.
226. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811 (1975).
227. Id. at 827. The state argued its legitimate purpose was in regulating the quality of health
care; however, the First Amendment would have been better served if the Court would have made a
determination as to whether the regulation was content-based. See supra notes 141-184 and
accompanying text (arguing the First Amendment requires an initial inquiry into whether a
regulation is content-based).
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the purpose of the commercial speech doctrine is to protect consumers
from such things as fraud or deception, “laws which attempt to limit
commercial speech for some other purpose . . . can be valid only if they
withstand full First Amendment scrutiny.”228
c. Preventing Commercial Harms
The Massachusetts regulations are arguably within the ambit of the
commercial speech doctrine because the stated purpose was to
“eliminate deception and unfairness in the way cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco products are marketed, sold and distributed. . . .”229 However,
the regulations do more than merely attempt to prevent commercial
harms.230 For instance, the Massachusetts regulations do not deal
exclusively with preventing deception.
Moreover, the federal
government has already legislated the issue of deception in the FCLA.231
It is clear that the major portion of the regulations were designed to

228. Nicole B. Casarez, Don’t Tell Me What to Say: Compelled Commercial Speech and the
First Amendment, 63 MO. L. REV. 929, 966 (1998) (stating it is a “more principled approach” to
restrict commercial speech only to those situations where it prevents a purely commercial harm).
229. 940 CMR § 21.01. The statute states:
The purpose of 940 CMR [§] 2100 is to eliminate deception and unfairness in the way
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products are marketed, sold and distributed in
Massachusetts in order to address the incidence of cigarette smoking and smokeless
tobacco use by children under legal age. 940 CMR [§] 21.00 imposes requirements and
restrictions on the sale and distribution of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products in
Massachusetts in order to prevent access to such products by underage consumers.
Id. The statement of purpose for the restrictions regarding cigars is essentially the same. 940 CMR
§ 22.01. However, the state also wanted to ensure that consumers were informed of the addictive
nature of cigars. Id. According to the statute:
The purpose of 940 CMR [§] 22.00 is to eliminate deception and unfairness in the way
cigars and little cigars are packaged, marketed, sold and distributed in Massachusetts
whereby:
(1) Massachusetts consumers may be adequately informed about the health risks
associated with cigar smoking, its addictive properties, and the false perception that
cigars are a safe alternative to cigarettes by requiring the cigar industry to include health
warnings on the package labels of cigars sold and distributed within Massachusetts and
in the advertisement of such products within Massachusetts; and
(2) the incidence of cigar use by children under legal age is addressed by imposing
requirements and restrictions on the sale and distribution of cigars in Massachusetts in
order to prevent access to such products by underage consumers.
Id.
230. See Arlen W. Langvardt, The Incremental Strengthening of First Amendment Protection
for Commercial Speech: Lessons from Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 587,
598 (2000) (discussing the measure of First Amendment protection afforded to commercial speech).
Commercial harms come from false, misleading advertisement, or from the advertisement of illegal
products. See id.
231. See supra note 7 (discussing federal legislation and regulation of tobacco products).
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prevent children from seeing tobacco advertisements.232 Because the
regulations do not address purely commercial harms, the commercial
speech doctrine should not have been applied.233
2. No Clear Rationale
According to Justice Thomas, the Court has been inconsistent in
applying the commercial speech doctrine.234 This is in part because
there is no basis for asserting that commercial speech is deserving of a
lower level of constitutional protection.235 In contrast, there is a firm
232. See 940 CMR §§ 21.01 – 22.09 (2002). A fundamental problem with the Massachusetts
regulations is the regulations also prevent adults from seeing tobacco advertisements. See Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 580 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgement). The Court has often recognized that despite the state’s interest in protecting children
from harmful materials, the First Amendment does not justify broad suppressions of speech. See,
e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (holding certain restrictions on the transmission of
obscene materials over the internet were unconstitutional restrictions on speech). The Supreme
Court has stated that it has “repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting children
from harmful materials. But that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of
speech addressed to adults.” Id. at 875 (citations omitted). Generally speaking, however, the State
will be allowed to restrict youth access to those products that are deemed obscene. See Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) (noting even constitutionally protected material may be
regulated when it comes to protecting children).
233. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 577 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgement).
234. Id. at 574 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgement). According to Justice
Thomas, “[t]here was once a time when this Court declined to give any First Amendment
protection to commercial speech . . . . That position was repudiated . . . . Since then, the Court has
followed an uncertain course – much of the uncertainty being generated by the malleability of the
four-part balancing test of Central Hudson.” Id. In fact, the Court itself has stated the Central
Hudson test is not “entirely discrete.” Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527
U.S. 173, 183-84 (1999). This means all four prongs of the Central Hudson test are “interrelated.”
Id. Moreover:
Each raises a relevant question that may not be dispositive to the First Amendment
inquiry, but the answer to which may inform a judgment concerning the other three.
Partly because of these intricacies [many petitioners, judges, and scholars] have
advocated repudiation of the Central Hudson standard and implementation of a more
straightforward and stringent test for assessing the validity of governmental restrictions
on commercial speech.
Id.
235. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part, concurring in judgement). According to Justice Thomas,
I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that “commercial” speech is
of a “lower value” than “noncommercial” speech . . . . Nor do I believe that the only
explanations that the Court has ever advanced for treating “commercial” speech
differently from other speech can justify restricting “commercial” speech in order to
keep information from legal purchasers so as to thwart what would otherwise be their
choices in the marketplace.
Id. In Lorillard, Justice Thomas went on to state he doubted “whether it is even possible to draw a
coherent distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech.” Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 575
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basis for arguing that strict scrutiny should be applied to content-based
regulations — the First Amendment, which prohibits the state from
restricting free speech.236 Arguably, the Court has been inconsistent in
applying the commercial speech doctrine because there is no clear
rationale behind it.237

(Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgement).
236. But see Jo-Jo Baldwin, Note, No Longer that Crazy Aunt in the Basement, Commercial
Speech Joins the Family, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 163, 166 (1997) (stating there is
disagreement over how to interpret the First Amendment). According to Baldwin:
[T]he framers did not clarify how to fulfill the promise of free speech in America, and
people disagree about the types of speech the First Amendment protects and the forms of
government action it prohibits. As a result, the guarantee of free speech has not received
a literal reading in American jurisprudence, and the United States Supreme Court has
produced a catalogue of balancing tests and speech categories that determines the
boundaries of our right to freedom of speech.
Id.
237. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 519-22 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgement) (discussing the inconsistent ways in which Central Hudson has been applied by the
Court). Moreover,
Unlike core First Amendment speech, commercial speech has only recently been
given constitutional protection. The United States Supreme Court has defined
commercial speech as speech that relates solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience. Needless to say, the Supreme Court’s definition is problematic.
The problem is that speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and services
has a protean quality. First, the line separating commercial from noncommercial speech
is nebulous. Speech is sometimes directed toward making the world a better place,
sometimes toward making a profit, and frequently toward a combination of both. Absent
resort to arbitrary distinctions that elevate form over substance, the difference between
speech incident to the sale of products which possesses ideological overtones, and
speech incident to the sale of ideas which encourages product sales, is often difficult to
discern.
Leonard J. Nannarone, Jr. Esq., Move Over Joe Camel: Governmental Attempts to Ban Tobacco
Advertising, 45 R.I. BAR JNL. 11, 11 (1997). Nannarone continues by noting the category
“commercial speech” is arbitrary. Id. He argues that it is both too large and yet too small. Id.
This special subset is simultaneously too large, in that it encompasses
noncommercial information dressed up as commercial advertising, and too small in that
it fails to encompass related variations of speech incident to the sale or promotion of
goods and services . . . .
Even assuming that commercial speech can be defined, it is difficult to determine
what amount of constitutional protection it deserves. Commercial speech is a hybrid of
commerce and speech. It is related both to the sale of goods and services and to the
ideas about those goods and services. As it relates to the sale or promotion of those
goods and services, it occupies to so-called marketplace of goods and services, where
government regulation is regarded as presumptively valid. On the other hand as it relates
to speech and ideological expression, it occupies the marketplace of ideas, where
content-based government regulation has traditionally been regarded as inherently
suspect.
Id at 11-12.
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3. No Consistent Standard
The Supreme Court may have had the best First Amendment
intentions when it enacted the Central Hudson test.238 However, the
Court has not been able to apply the test consistently.239 The test may be
too complicated, especially in light of modern society.240 In addition,
the test is highly subjective, encouraging variations in judicial
interpretation.241 Because the Court cannot analyze cases under Central
Hudson with any sort of predictability, it should not try to force contentbased regulations into an intermediate scrutiny analysis.242 Doing so
further dissolves Central Hudson and ineffectively protects the First
Amendment rights of the speaker.243

238. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-66. The Court apparently went through great effort
to come up with a test that balanced the interests of all those concerned. See id. In creating the
four-part test, the Court acknowledged the rights of the speaker and the listener, while at the same
time acknowledging the rights of the state. Id.
239. See also supra Part II, notes 60-74 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Aaron A. Schmoll,
Sobriety Test: The Court Walks the Central Hudson Line Once Again in 44 Liquormart, But Passes
on a New First Amendment Review, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 753, 754 (1998). “If one were to consider
the intermediate-level scrutiny given commercial speech as a straight line, the Supreme Court has
barely been able to walk it without tripping over its precedents during the past fifteen years.” Id.
240. Schmoll, supra note 239, at 754-55.
[T]he Central Hudson test is too complicated and manipulable to provide any certainty
of protection. . . . [A]s society becomes more commercialized, the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial becomes obscure. Today’s political statement is
tomorrow’s Web-page endorsement. The nature of speech is one of multiple meanings,
and it would be contrary to the intent of the First Amendment to reduce speech to its
lowest common denominator.
Id.
241. See id. (arguing the last two prongs of the Central Hudson test are subjective).
242. See id. at 772-73.
The Court historically has had difficulty analyzing commercial speech. Since the middle
of this century, protection for commercial speech has improved from none to some level
of intermediate scrutiny. The importance of advertising has seemingly improved in the
minds of the Justices, while the Court has begun to more carefully consider the state’s
motivation for regulation. However, the road the Court has taken . . . since the adoption
of Central Hudson, fails to consider consistently opposing these forces. In one instance,
the Court embraces the state-sponsored paternalism; it sees through it and discards it in
the next. Only by adopting an absolute, less-manipulable test can the Court avoid the
pitfalls of its own creation.
Id.
243. But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The
Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 124 (1996) (stating the Court has recently
found in favor of the advertiser for First Amendment challenges). Where desired, Central Hudson
will allow content-based regulations to undergo only an intermediate scrutiny analysis. Id. at 156.
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C. The Government Interest
Often the government will have a valid interest at stake.244
However, it is more important to see that First Amendment safeguards
are afforded to the speaker, especially when the government seeks to
regulate speech on the basis of content.245 Applying strict scrutiny to
content-based regulations will protect any valid interest the government
may have, and it will also protect the speaker’s First Amendment
rights.246 The government is free to protect its interest by drafting
regulations that will pass strict scrutiny, or alternatively, it can enact
content-neutral regulations.247
1. Passing the Strict Scrutiny Test
Government regulations that are content-based can still pass strict
scrutiny.248 To pass strict scrutiny, the government would merely have
to design regulations that are narrowly tailored and that have no less
restrictive alternative.249 The Massachusetts regulations, as they stood,
would not have passed strict scrutiny because of how they were
drafted.250
244. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001) (finding the state’s
interest in preventing underage smoking was substantial). See also supra Part I, notes 3-5 and 1113 (noting the increase in tobacco consumption by minors and the devastating consequences of
tobacco addiction).
245. But see Sullivan, supra note 243, at 129 (stating there are those who feel that commercial
speech deserves no “robust protection at all”). See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text
(discussing the importance and meaning behind the First Amendment).
246. But see Nannarone, supra note 237 at 44 (noting tobacco advertising bans would likely
fail even Central Hudson if it was applied more strictly); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech,
Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2418 (1996)
(arguing a better approach would be a per se ban on content-based regulations because the Court is
inconsistent in applying strict scrutiny).
247. See infra notes 257-265 and accompanying text (discussing how the Massachusetts
regulations could be content-neutral).
248. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 195 (1992) (finding strict scrutiny satisfied
for a content-based regulation that aimed to prohibit individuals from campaigning within one
hundred feet of an election polling place). The regulation at issue in Burson was content based. Id.
at 198. In fact, it was a “facially content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum . . .
.” Id. Yet, the Court found the statute to be constitutional because the state met its burden of
proving a compelling interest that was narrowly tailored, with no less restrictive means available.
Id. at 199-211.
249. U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (discussing strict scrutiny
and holding that restrictions requiring cable operators to scramble sexually explicit programs, or to
restrict such programming to certain hours, failed the strict scrutiny test because there were less
restrictive means).
250. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgement) (noting the Massachusetts regulations would have failed even
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However, Massachusetts’ “1,000 foot rule” may have been drafted
in such a way as to pass strict scrutiny.251 First, assume the State of
Massachusetts had a compelling interest in trying to prevent underage
smoking.252 Second, assume the regulation did not require a blanket rule
prohibiting tobacco advertising within one thousand feet of playgrounds,
public parks, or schools. Rather, the regulation prohibited such
advertising within direct sight of those areas where children typically
play or gather.253 Third, assume the State of Massachusetts had already
taken steps to regulate all other non-speech methods of preventing
underage tobacco consumption.254 Perhaps, then, the regulations could
have passed a strict scrutiny.255 However, even if a state cannot draft
intermediate scrutiny).
251. See infra notes 252-56 and accompanying text (discussing the necessary elements of strict
scrutiny).
252. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561. But see id. at 582 (Thomas, J. concurring in part, concurring
in judgement) (“Massachusetts asserts a compelling interest in reducing tobacco use among minors.
Applied to adults, an interest in manipulating market choices by keeping people ignorant would not
be legitimate, let alone compelling.”). Id.
253. See id. at 584. According to Justice Thomas, the majority was correct in finding the
“1,000 foot” rule was not narrowly tailored because it was arbitrary. Id. Thomas, however, went
further in his analysis when he stated:
A prohibited zone defined solely by circles drawn around schools and playgrounds is
necessarily overinclusive, regardless of the radii of the circles. Consider, for example, a
billboard located within [one thousand] feet of a school, but visible only from an
elevated freeway that runs nearby. Such a billboard would not threaten any of the
interests respondents assert, but it would be banned anyway, because the regulations take
no account of whether the advertisement could even be seen by children.
Id. at 585. See also William E. Lee, The Unwilling Listener: Hill v. Colorado’s Chilling Effect on
Unorthodox Speech, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 387, 390 (2002) (comparing the tailoring of the
regulations in Hill and the regulations in Lorillard and examining the Court’s holding on this issue
as compared to the two cases).
254. According to Justice Thomas:
In addition to examining a narrower advertising ban, the State should have examined
ways of advancing its interest that [did] not require limiting speech at all. Here, [the
State] had several alternatives. Most obviously, they could have directly regulated the
conduct with which they were concerned. Massachusetts already prohibits the sale of
tobacco to minors, but it could take steps to enforce that prohibition more vigorously. It
also could enact laws prohibiting the purchase, possession, or use of tobacco by minors.
And, if its concern is that tobacco advertising communicates a message with which it
disagrees, it could seek to counteract that message with “more speech, not enforced
silence.”
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 586 (Thomas, J. concurring in part, concurring in judgement) (citations
omitted). See also Sullivan, supra note 243, at 160 (arguing the states can seek to achieve the same
goals by other means). According to Sullivan, the states “might achieve the same consumer
protection goals through direct regulation of production and sales, shifting means but not altering
ends.” Id.
255. But see Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 587 (Thomas, J. concurring) (arguing that to uphold
regulations on tobacco would call into question other types of advertising that produced harmful
effects). Justice Thomas stated:
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regulations to pass strict scrutiny, it can enact content-neutral
regulations.256
2. The O’Brien Test for Content Neutral Regulations
Even if the Commonwealth of Massachusetts could not have
satisfied the strict scrutiny test with its content-based regulations, it
would not be left without means to protect its interest.257 States are free
to enact content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations.258 Such
[I]t seems appropriate to point out that to uphold . . . tobacco regulations would be to
accept a line of reasoning that would permit restrictions on advertising for a host of other
products. . . . Tobacco use is, we are told, “the single leading cause of preventable death
in the United States.” The second largest contributor to mortality rates in the United
States is obesity. . . . Respondents say that tobacco companies are covertly targeting
children in their advertising. Fast food companies do so openly. Moreover, there is
considerable evidence that they have been successful in changing children’s eating
behavior . . . . So even though fast food is not addictive in the same way tobacco is,
children’s exposure to fast food advertising can have deleterious consequences that are
difficult to reverse.
Id. at 587-88 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Justice Thomas continues by making a
similar analogy to alcohol. Id. at 588. He mentions alcohol related problems and notes children
oftentimes view alcohol advertising, and yet the state did not place such comparable restrictions on
its advertising. Id. He concludes by noting that Massachusetts had “identified no principle of law
or logic that would preclude the imposition of restrictions on fast food and alcohol advertising
similar to those they seek to impose on tobacco advertising.” Id. at 589. See also Mark R.
Ludwikowsi, Proposed Government Regulation of Tobacco Advertising Uses Teens to Disguise
First Amendment Violations, 4 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 105, 110 (1996) (discussing the argument
that not all advertising of harmful products can be banned).
256. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984) (holding an
ordinance prohibiting camping in parks did not violate the First Amendment). Generally speaking:
Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable
time, place, or manner restrictions. [The Supreme Court] has often noted that
restrictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.
Id. at 293 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
257. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (establishing a test for contentneutral regulations); Stan M. Weber, Note, City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J.
157, 164 (1995) (discussing content-neutral regulations as compared to content-based restrictions).
258. See Weber, supra note 257, at 164. Content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions
are those that regulate speech without taking into consideration the content of the speech. Id.
“Often these restrictions aim at the noncommunicative aspects speech.” Id. See also City of Erie v.
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 290 (2000) (finding an ordinance prohibiting nude dancing was not
targeting erotic expression, but public nudity in general). But see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
412 (1989) (finding strict scrutiny applies to content-based non-speech restrictions). Certain
restrictions that are seemingly content-neutral can be subject to strict scrutiny if those restrictions
intend to restrict conduct intended to express an idea. Id. at 404. According to the Johnson Court:
The First Amendment literally forbids the abridgment only of “speech,” but we have
long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word. While we
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regulations, which are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, are
constitutional if they pass the test set forth in O’Brien.259 Basically,
content-neutral regulations must further an important or substantial
government interest, be unrelated to the suppression of free speech, be
no greater than essential, and allow alternative means of
communication.260
The Massachusetts regulations were not content-neutral.261 This is
not to say the government could not have drafted a content-neutral set of
regulations.262 It would have been possible for the government to have
adopted restrictions on all forms of advertising.263 For instance, the
government could have attempted to prohibit the advertisement of all
adult products within a certain area of parks, playgrounds and schools.264
However, it must be noted that a state choosing to blindly wipe out all
forms of advertising must have an extremely substantial interest, because
have rejected “the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea,” we have acknowledged that conduct may be “sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to fall within the scope of the [First Amendment].”
Id. (citations omitted).
259. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; supra note 32 (discussing the test for content-neutral time,
place, and manner restrictions).
260. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
261. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 574 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgement). Although Justice Thomas did not analyze the Massachusetts regulations
under intermediate scrutiny, he did note they were not content-neutral restrictions. Id.
262. Cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725-26 (2000) (holding a regulation prohibiting all
speech within one hundred feet of a healthcare facility was a valid restriction of time, place, and
manner). In Hill, the State of Colorado enacted a statute, which made it unlawful for one person to
approach another, without consent, for the purpose of “passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a
sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person. . . .” Id. at 707.
While the statute did not regulate the content of the prohibited speech, it made it more difficult for
persons to give unsolicited advice. Id. The Court found the statute constitutional for three reasons.
Id. at 719. First, the Court stated it was not a regulation of speech, but a regulation of place. Id.
Second, the Court noted that the regulation was not adopted in order to prohibit any particular
message. Id. Third, the Court found the state had a valid interest in protecting a person’s rights to
access and privacy and providing police with clear guidelines. Id. at 719-20.
263. But see, Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 580 (Thomas, J. concurring in part, concurring in
judgement). According to Justice Thomas, a state cannot blindly restrict advertising. See id. “Even
if [a state] has a valid interest in regulating speech directed at children — who, it argues, may be
more easily mislead . . . it may not pursue that interest at the expense of the free speech rights of
adults.” Id.
264. But see id. According to Justice Thomas, “[i]t is difficult to see any stopping point to a
rule that would allow a State to prohibit all speech in favor of an activity in which it is illegal for
minors to engage.” Id. However, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court held the government
had a valid interest in protecting children from an offensive radio broadcast. 438 U.S. 726, 749
(1978). The Court’s holding seemed to be based on the accessibility of the material. See id. at 74950. According to the Court, “[t]he ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast
material . . . justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting.” Id. at 750.
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the First Amendment rights of adult listeners would be at stake.265
3. No “Vice” Exception
“The extent to which government ought to regulate the promotion
of so-called ‘vice’ products like tobacco and alcohol, and activities such
as gambling, is one of the most controversial contemporary advertising
issues.”266 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has refused to apply a
“vice” exception to the commercial speech doctrine.267 Because there is
265. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1998) (finding a statute
prohibiting the mailing of contraceptive information unconstitutional). In Bolger, the Court was
forced to decide whether a statute prohibiting a person from mailing information relating to
contraception was unconstitutional. Id. at 61. In finding the statute unconstitutional, the Court
looked at the state’s interest and the interests of the adult listener. Id. at 68-75. In an oft-cited
statement, Justice Marshall noted “[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be
limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox.” Id. at 74. Moreover, the Court has noted
certain restrictions, designed to protect minors, can be overbroad. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S.
380, 383-84 (1957). In Butler, the Court found a Michigan statute regulating adult materials was
unconstitutional. Id. at 384. According to the Court, “The State insists that by . . . quarantining the
general reading public against books not too rugged for grown men and women in order to shield
juvenile innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general welfare. Surely, this is to burn
the house to roast the pig.” Id. at 383. (emphasis added).
266. Michael Hoefges and Milgros Rivera-Sanchez, “Vice” Advertising Under the Supreme
Court’s Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Shifting Commercial Speech Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT L.J 345, 347 (2000). According to Hoefges and Rivera-Sanchez:
Advertisers spend massive amounts of money each year seeking customers for legal
products such as cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, beer, wine, and distilled spirits; and
lawful gambling facilities such as state lotteries, private and public casinos, and horse
and dog racing tracks, among others.
Often, when federal or state governments seek to curtail the potentially harmful
effects of these products and activities, restrictions on advertising are politically
attractive. The legislative rationale often assumes that curtailing advertising for a product
like alcohol, for instance, will dampen consumer demand and thus alleviate social costs
related to harmful secondary effects, like alcoholism.
Id.
267. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482, n. 2 (1995) (suggesting it would be
difficult to define a “vice” exception to the Central Hudson test). See generally P. Cameron
Devore, First Amendment Protection of “Vice” Advertising: Current Commercial Speech Hot
Buttons, 15 COMM. LAW. 3 (discussing the First Amendment and how the Court has applied it to the
so-called “vices”). It is also important to note that once something is deemed a “vice” and its
advertising is prohibited, the possibility of a slippery slope becomes great. Ludwikowsi, supra note
255, at 110. If restrictions, such as tobacco restrictions are implemented,
[W]ill the simple appearance of cigarettes in movies or on television thereafter be
banned because celebrities smoking may negatively influence children? It is not
improbable to suspect that a ban on tobacco advertising [would] lead to gags on
manufacturers of other products that at any given time may be considered politically
incorrect.
Id. Moreover, the government may not act as a censor. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 209 (1975). In discussing the effects of certain types of speech upon the unwilling listener, the
Erznoznik Court stated:
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no vice exception, the argument that strict scrutiny should apply to
content-based restrictions of a commercial nature is even stronger
because states will undoubtedly attempt to circumvent Central Hudson
to prohibit the advertising of so-called “vices.”268
D. Strict Scrutiny Prevents the Erosion of First Amendment Principles
It is important that the Court strike a balance between valid,
legitimate government interests and maintainence of First Amendment
safeguards.269 The First Amendment focuses not only on the rights of
the speaker, but also on the rights of the listener.270 It is important the
listener have access to truthful, non-misleading information in order to
prevent government encroachment on individual rights.271 Strict
scrutiny would ensure that the principles of the First Amendment are
A State or municipality may protect individual privacy by enacting reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content. But when
the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some
kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the First
Amendment strictly limits its power.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
268. See generally Kathleen E. Burke, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v.
United States: Broadcasters Have Lady Luck, or At Least the First Amendment, on Their Side, 35
NEW ENG. L. REV. 471, 497-99 (2001) (discussing the government’s attempts at circumventing
Central Hudson by way of a “vice” exception).
269. See notes 22-28 and accompanying text (discussing the importance and history of the First
Amendment).
270. See Robert T. Cahill, Jr., Casenote, City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.:
Towards Heightened Scrutiny For Truthful Commercial Speech?, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 225, 252
(1994) (stating it is important for commercial speech regulations to be examined from the listener’s
perspective). Cahill advises that the Court adopt a three-tiered approach to analyzing commercial
speech regulations. Id. He proposes that:
The first tier pertains to commercial speech that is untruthful, misleading, coercive, or
related to an unlawful activity. Regulations which suppress this type of commercial
speech will be upheld by the Court so long as the state has a rational basis to conclude
that the regulation advances the state’s interest in preventing untruthful speech. The
second tier involves regulations “designed to protect consumers from misleading or
coercive speech” or a regulation seeking to remedy the secondary effects of misleading
speech. These regulations are entitled to Central Hudson’s intermediate level of
scrutiny. The third tier involves regulations that suppress “truthful commercial speech
designed to serve some other government purpose.” These regulations will only be
upheld if the regulation survives strict scrutiny.
...
Because the listener has a substantial interest in hearing truthful, commercial speech,
commercial speech deserves a high level of judicial scrutiny.
Id. at 251-52 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
271. Cf. John M. Faust, Note, Of Saloons and Social Control: Assessing the Impact of State
Liquor Control on Individual Expression, 80 VA. L. REV. 745, 745-46 (1994) (arguing attempts by
the government to institute controls on liquor allow a “quiet intrusion” on individual rights).
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upheld by forcing states to prove the necessity of any proposed
regulations and by ensuring that the state regulates speech only as a last
resort.272
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should apply strict scrutiny to content-based
regulations. It is not enough for the Court to apply the watered-down
commercial speech doctrine every time profit motivates the speaker.
Surely the State may have a valid interest in regulating speech. The
State’s interest in Lorillard was valid — even noble. But the
Massachusetts regulations were content-based and should have been
analyzed as such. Hopefully, the next time the Court decides this issue it
will follow Justice Thomas’ lead. He was correct in his analysis of
Lorillard. He is also correct when he noted that:
No legislature has ever sought to restrict speech about an activity it
regarded as harmless and inoffensive. Calls for limits on expression
always are made when the specter of some threatened harm is looming.
The identity of the harm may vary. People will be inspired by
totalitarian dogmas and subvert the Republic. They will be inflamed
by racial demagoguery and embrace hatred and bigotry. Or they will
be enticed by cigarette advertisements and choose to smoke, risking
disease. It is therefore no answer for the State to say that the makers of
cigarettes are doing harm: perhaps they are. But in that respect they
are no different from the purveyors of other harmful products, or the
advocates of harmful ideas. When the State seeks to silence them, they
are all entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.273

Kerri L. Keller

272. But see Timothy R. Mortimer, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island: A Toast to the First
Amendment, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1049, 1091-92 (1998) (stating that it is unlikely the Court will
abandon Central Hudson in favor of strict scrutiny). However, Mortimer notes “the level of
scrutiny under which the Central Hudson test is applied is in question.” Id. at 1091. Moreover, he
states that “the Court’s current trend is toward, although still shy of, affording commercial speech
the same level of protection other forms of protected speech enjoy.” Id. at 1092.
273. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 590 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgement).
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